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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the issue of coercive interrogations has generated a great deal of
debate and commentary in both the popular media and academia. It is not unreasonable
to conclude that any discussion of what constitutes a coercive interrogation focuses on
whether a government can engage in torture to obtain information that would thwart an

impending terrorist attack threatening the lives of many innocent civilians. In the
United States, the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks by al-Qaeda has seen a
heightened focus on the methods of interrogation employed by U.S. authorities, both
civilian and military, when questioning those deemed to be suspected terrorists. The
controversy engendered by the establishment of a detention camp and system of
military tribunals in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,' the Abu Ghraib scandal,2 and the
existence of the so-called "extraordinary rendition" measure 3 demonstrates this
dilemma most vividly in both the popular and academic realm. The weighty issue of
what is permitted in interrogating suspected terrorists has also merged with a debate on
the power of the executive branch in a time of war, specifically the power to designate
U.S. citizens as enemy combatants to be held and questioned without being charged or
afforded any of the constitutional rights that inure to criminal defendants.
However, the issue of how the United States' courts, in criminal cases, should treat
statements that defendants have given to foreign law-enforcement bodies or security

* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. A.B., Princeton
University; J.D., Columbia University. I would like to thank George Bisharat, Tommy Crocker,
Lisa Eichhom, and Susan Kuo for reviewing earlier drafts ofthis Article and providing helpful
comments and suggestions. Many thanks to Lloyd Flores for excellent research assistance. This
Article is dedicated to the memory of Marc E. Guerette.
1. See, e.g., LAUREL E. FLETCHER & ERIC STOVER, THE GUANTANAMO EFFECT: EXPOSING
THE CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PRACTICES (2009).

2. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2085 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Ararv. Ashcroft, No. 06-4216-cv, 2009 WL 3522887 (2d Cir. Nov. 2,2009).
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services, especially when those statements may have been the product of a coercive
interrogation, is an important matter meriting its own discussion. With a new president
in office pledging to close the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay within a year,' a
move that could signify the end of the United States' experiment with trying suspected
terrorists in extraordinary tribunals, the federal courts could in turn serve as the central
forum for the government's antiterrorism efforts. While not arising exclusively in the
context of a war on terrorism, the issue of foreign confessions has taken on a renewed
relevance in light of current events, and it is compounded by the perceived
extraordinary nature of terrorist crimes themselves. In particular, two recent federal
cases, UnitedStates v. Abu Ali, 5 in which the defendant was held and interrogated in6
Saudi Arabia for a year and a half on suspicion of involvement with an al-Qaeda cell,
and United States v. Abu Marzook,7 in which one defendant had previously been
arrested, interrogated, and convicted in Israel on charges ofmembership and support of
Hamas, 8 have addressed the question of when a confession obtained abroad by a
foreign agency will be admitted into evidence. Both federal courts allowed the
admission of the statements made abroad despite the defendants' respective claims that
their confessions were the product of coercive interrogation. 9 In so ruling, these cases
revealed that current legal standards fail to lead courts to consider all relevant factors
in assessing the admissibility of a foreign confession in the United States. Further,
these cases also beg the question as to whether or not there is a separate and distinct
standard for confessions made by alleged terrorists, as opposed to ordinary criminals.
This Article aims to demonstrate that the legal mechanism in place for assessing
whether a statement obtained abroad was improperly coerced-namely, the
voluntariness testl°-is unwieldy and ultimately too subjective. The much-criticized
test, which had governed the admissibility ofdomestic confessions prior to the decision
in Miranda v. Arizona,1 ' envisions an inquiry into the conditions of the suspect's
interrogation, as well as an evaluation of his or her own personal characteristics. 1 2 In
evaluating the totality of the circumstances, a court determines whether the defendant's
statements were coerced based on a preponderance of the evidence.1 3 When the
prosecution seeks to admit statements given to foreign agents, the primary source of

4. Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Under Obama Is Preparingfor DoctrinalShift in Policies
ofBush Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,2009, at A14; Susan Saulny, Michigan PrisonIs Considered
for Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, at A17.
5. 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
6. Id. at 224-26.
7. 435 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. I11.2006).
8. Id. at 712-13.
9. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 234; Abu Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 777.
10. The voluntariness inquiry is alternatively referred to as that of an "involuntary
confession." See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165-66 (1986) (referring to the same test
under both terms).
11. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 232; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226
(1973).
13. See Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 231 (stating that the district court found that the government
"'demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence"' that the statements were voluntary
(quoting United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 342 (E.D. Va. 2005))).
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evidence is the foreign agent's own testimony that the statements were not coerced. 14
Today, when the test is applied to confessions elicited abroad, especially in the
terrorism context, where fear can color a court's perspective, it is far too easy to
conclude that a foreign agent is telling the truth when he testifies that he did not abuse
a defendant.
Ultimately, any evaluation of this thorny issue requires a more objective standard
that reflects reality. In this regard, this Article makes several proposals. First, in cases
of interrogations involving countries and intelligence agencies about which the State
Department itself has found credible and sustained evidence regarding systematic use
of torture and coercive tactics, this evidence must make its way into the record. The
government should not be allowed to argue that coercive interrogation did not occur in
the instant prosecution without directly confronting its previous recognition of the
prevalence of the practice in the country at issue. Second, the government should be
required to prove the voluntariness of any statements by clear and convincing evidence
and not by the preponderance of the evidence standard currently in effect. While the
latter standard applies to general motions to suppress, a heightened standard is
necessary in the foreign interrogation context to eliminate the admission of any
illegally obtained evidence. Finally, the inquiry into the voluntariness of a confession
made abroad should, to the extent possible, avoid focusing on the actions or
characteristics of the defendant. The Supreme Court has recognized that a lack of
intelligence or awareness on a defendant's part can indicate that a confession was
involuntary in the domestic context. 15 In the foreign context, however, especially where
the focus of an investigation is on political crimes, a more informed defendant who is
aware of a foreign agency's reputation for harsh interrogation techniques may be more
likely to falsely confess rather than suffer the potential abusive treatment.
Part I of this Article provides a short explication of the legal standards that govern
the admissibility of foreign confessions, including exceptions to the voluntariness test.
Part II discusses the Abu Ali and Abu Marzook cases in detail and analyzes the relevant
decisions as they pertain to the admission of the foreign statements at issue. The
particulars of these two cases reveal a legal test with ample room for arbitrariness in
the decision-making process. Part III places the Abu Ali and Abu Marzook cases in a
broader context and proposes methods to ensure that statements made abroad are not
admitted when made in conditions that indicate an unacceptable level of coercion.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS
6

A statement made abroad will be admitted if found to have been made voluntarily.'
The voluntary test is a test that envisions a highly fact-specific inquiry into the
circumstances in which the statement was made. Courts have recognized two
exceptions to this general rule: if the statement came as a result of tactics that "shock
the conscience," or was the product of a "joint venture" between American and foreign
law enforcement, it will be excluded. 17 Identifying the legal standards that govern

14. See, e.g., Abu Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 713-14 (stating that the court heard over six
days of testimony from two witnesses who were foreign interrogators from Israel).
15. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-23 (1959).

16. E.g.,AbuAli, 528 F.3d at 227.
17. Id. at 228; Abu Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 744.
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admissibility of foreign confessions is a relatively straightforward task; fashioning
reliable tests out of those standards is more complicated.
A. Voluntariness

The central and most important of the legal tests that govern the admissibility of
foreign confessions turns on whether they have been made voluntarily. This standard
governed confessions made in the United States prior to the issuance of Miranda v.
Arizona 8 by the Supreme Court in 1966.'9 Unlike Miranda, which is rooted in the
Fifth Amendment's ban on self-incrimination, the voluntariness test sprang from the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the state context, and the Fifth
Amendment's eponymous clause in the federal context, although in its current guise "it
is unclear from which provision in the Bill of Rights it emanates. 20 Inspired by Brain
v. United States,21 this test has been applied explicitly by a number of circuits when
dealing with the admissibility of foreign confessions.22 Today, after Miranda, the
system of warnings envisioned by that case is still not required when dealing with
statements made to foreign law-enforcement authorities and, therefore, the
exclusionary rule will not bar the introduction of those statements in a criminal trial in
the United States.23 This rule is rooted in inherently practical considerations, as the

18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-35 (2000) (discussing the
history and continuing viability of the voluntariness test); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 30405 (1985); Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 227 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145

(2d Cir. 2003)). Incidentally, while the Supreme Court has yet to address directly the
inapplicability of Miranda to purely foreign interrogations, the lower courts are unanimous in so
holding. See, e.g., Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 227.
20. Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the InvoluntaryConfession Rule: Toward a Workable Test
for Identifying CompelledSelf-Incrimination,93 CAL. L. REv. 465,470-71,489-90 (2005). The
Supreme Court first employed the Fourteenth Amendment test in 1936 in the seminal case of
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), which involved a confession obtained by the torture
of a black defendant by white police officers in rural Mississippi; the origins of the test in the
federal, Fifth Amendment context are less clear. See Paul Cassell & Robert Litt, Will Miranda
Survive?: Dickerson v. United States: The Right to Remain Silent, The Supreme Court, and
Congress, 37 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1165, 1168 (2000) (stating that during the era of deciding the
admissibility of confessions under the voluntariness test, "in federal prosecutions, the Court
relied on the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment to overturn convictions"); Lawrence
Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory SelfIncriminationand the Involuntary Confession Rule (PartI1), 53 OHO ST. L.J. 497, 499-500
(1992).
21. 168 U.S. 532 (1897). Incidentally, Brain's voluntariness test derived from the selfincrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688
(1993).
22. E.g., United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1974); Brulay v. United

States, 383 F.2d 345, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1967) ("We then turn to the problem: were the
statements voluntary within Fifth Amendment standards which we believe to be applicable?").
But see United States v. Wolf, 813 F.2d 970, 972 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (questioning Brulay's
continuing viability on this issue in light of Coloradov. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986)).
23. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 227 (citing United States v. Martindale, 790 F.2d 1129, 1132 (4th
Cir. 1986)); Brulay, 383 F.2d at 348-49; see also United States v. Chavarria, 443 F.2d 904,905
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United States cannot dictate to other countries what rights suspects should receive, nor
would the exclusionary rule deter
any type of misconduct by foreign police operating
24
in their own home countries.
While the idea that Mirandawarnings would be required whenever an individual is
interrogated by foreign law enforcement is, at best, unrealistic, the voluntariness test is
designed to comport with the minimum requirements of the Constitution.2 5 The
standards that govern the voluntariness test are derived from Supreme Court precedent
dealing with confessions made in the domestic criminal context, although it bears note
"that neither linguistics nor epistemology will provide a ready definition of the
meaning of 'voluntariness.'26 What must be shown is that any confession represents an
individual's "'essentially free and unconstrained choice."' 27 On the other hand, if a
defendant's "'will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired, the use of his confession offends due process."' 28 The government must
make a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any statements it wishes to
introduce meet the above standards, and the Supreme Court has also noted that a
voluntariness inquiry has
nothing at all to do with a confession's reliability, which is an
29
entirely separate issue.
"In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the
Court [assesses] the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation." 30 A nonexhaustive
list of factors includes an individual's age, level of intelligence, and education; an
assessment of whether the individual was informed of constitutional rights; the length
of the detention; the nature and length of questioning; and any evidence of physical
punishment involving the denial of food or sleep.3 1 In addition to physical torture,
threats thereof, as well as psychological torture and conditions of detention, are
relevant to whether a confession or statement is made voluntarily. 32 In short, while the
(9th Cir. 1971).
24. Chavarria,443 F.2d at 905; Brulay, 383 F.2d at 348-49; see also United States v.
Covington, 783 F.2d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1985) (recognizing the importance of the
Constitutional inquiry, while also noting that "the exclusionary rule is not applicable if the
statements are obtained by foreign officers in a foreign country even if it may violate the foreign
law").
25. See, e.g., Covington, 783 F.2d at 1056.

26. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
27. Id. at 225.
28. Id.
at 225-26 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,602 (1961)); see also
United States v. Wilson, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896) ("In short, the true test of admissibility is
that the confession is made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any
sort.").
29. United States v. Raddatz, 446 U.S. 667,678 (1980) (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 486 (1972)). The Fifth Amendment also envisions that evidence adduced be reliable, and
statements or confessions obtained as a result of coercive pressure, especially where such
pressure rises to the level of torture, are inherently unreliable. See United States v. Karake, 443
F. Supp. 2d 8, 50-51 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985));
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218.
30. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.

31. Id.
32. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 51-52
(providing an overview of relevant cases).
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voluntariness test is the central vehicle for determining whether statements made to
foreign agents are admissible in a criminal case, an individualized inquiry into the facts
surrounding the interrogation is envisioned as the method for making that
determination. As a result, these flexible standards can make it difficult to predict with
any regularity how a particular decision may turn out.
In purely domestic cases, the voluntariness test retains its vitality in the postMirandaworld primarily as a vehicle to assess whether waivers of Miranda rights are
made voluntarily, thus rendering postwaiver confessions admissible in court.33 That is
not to say that the test has been anything but unclear and controversial, especially given
subsequent case law and the Mirandadoctrine. Yale Kamisar, the preeminent scholar
of the law of confessions, noted in an influential law review article in 1963 that, with
respect to the due process voluntariness test as it then existed, "'there are some words
which, owing to their history, needlessly obstruct clear thinking,' and 'voluntary,'
'involuntary,' et al., are surely among them." 34 Scholars discussing the test have
criticized its lack of clarity and determinative features, and have debated whether its
focus should be on coercive police behavior as opposed to the reliability of the
confession elicited.35 Prior to Miranda, the notion of assessing what constituted an
involuntary confession inexorably led to confusion in how those standards, in their
imprecision, were to be applied.36 Indeed, the lack of clear standards for the
voluntariness test prior to Miranda seems to have persisted in the post-Miranda
world.37 What has changed, however, is the likelihood that a confession will be
suppressed on voluntariness grounds; since Miranda was decided, the Supreme Court

33. See, e.g., Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L.
REv. 2001, 2004 (1998) ("Because the admissibility of statements given after a valid waiver of
Miranda rights must be determined on the basis of the voluntariness test, that test remains
vitally important." (citation omitted)).
34. Yale Kamisar, What Is an 'Involuntary' Confession? Some Comments on Inabu and

Reid's Criminal Investigations and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728, 759 (1963) (quoting
JEROME FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 139 (1945)) (footnote omitted).
35. See, e.g., Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court,the Attorney General,and the Good
Old Days ofPoliceInterrogation, 48 OHIO ST.L.J. 733, 745-55 (1987); Yale Kamisar, On the
Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got It-And What

Happenedto It, 5OFHo ST.J. CRIM. L. 163, 163-69 (2007); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and
Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REv. 673, 728-29 (1992) (noting that the pre-Miranda Supreme Court
moved away from reliability as the sole factor underlying its analysis of the voluntary nature of a
confession when the methods under scrutiny were less brutal and more subtle); Charles D.
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 113-14 (1998).
36. See, e.g., Godsey, supra note 20, at 470 ("[T]he vast 'wiggle room' inherent in the
highly subjective voluntariness test offers judges free rein to interpret the facts of an
interrogation in a myriad of ways, thus making a finding that a confession was made
involuntarily very rare in practice."); Seidman, supra note 35, at 733 (calling the Culombe
opinion a "total disaster" that saw Justice Harlan, in dissent, agreeing with the voluntariness test
articulated by Justice Frankfurter's opinion, but disagreeing with the result based on the facts of
the case, a "fiasco" that "laid the groundwork for Miranda").
37. Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators'
Strategiesfor Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REv. 397, 464-65
(1999); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 105, 116 (1997).
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has reversed
a confession given after warnings were administered on only two
3
occasions. 8
While it might be surprising that the voluntariness test has survived in the domestic
context to the present day, its application to confessions made to foreign agents abroad
has generated no real controversy. This lack of debate is puzzling given that cases
involving allegations of the type of Islamist terrorism have exercised so many in the
last several years. It is perhaps not unreasonable to conclude that such a poorly defined
test could lead reasonable people to disagree on what constitutes a voluntary
confession, especially when gauging the nature and degree of the threat an individual
defendant may represent.
B. Shocks the Conscience
While the voluntariness inquiry, however maligned, may seem straightforward, a
complicating factor involves the use of what courts have deemed the "shock the
conscience" test as part of the relevant inquiry in deciding the admissibility of
statements given to foreign agents. 39 This test allows courts to exclude even
"voluntary" statements made to foreign agents if they were given under standards that
shock the judicial conscience.4 ° It necessarily demands a specific inquiry into the
circumstances of any confession, since what might shock the conscience needs to be
spelled out in some detail. This rule is generally posited as an exception to the
voluntariness test; that is, even statements made voluntarily will be found inadmissible
if elicited under standards that shock the conscience. 41 At least one federal court has
criticized the "shock the conscience" test as both superfluous to the issue of
voluntariness and as inapplicable to the Fifth Amendment due process inquiry because
of its roots in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.42
The criticism raises strong points in both instances. With respect to the issue of
voluntariness, it seems difficult to construe a confession as made "voluntarily," when it
was elicited under circumstances that "shock the conscience.' 43 The test is therefore of
questionable validity when a voluntariness inquiry would demand almost ofnecessity a
determination as to whether the conduct of foreign agents "shocks the conscience.""

38. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
By way of contrast, in the twenty-five years prior to Miranda,there were some twenty-three
Supreme Court decisions reversing convictions on voluntariness grounds. See Seidman, supra
note 35, at 745.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Heller, 625 F.2d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing United
States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir. 1976)); United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708,
712 n.10 (2d Cir. 1975).
40. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2003).
41. Id.; see also United States v. Abu Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 744 (N.D. Ill. 2006);
United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 380 (E.D. Va. 2005).
42. United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 52-53 nn.73-74 (D.D.C. 2006).
43. Id. at 52 n.73 (criticizing the Second Circuit's inconsistent application of the test and
noting that "[w]hile statements which would be considered 'involuntary' under the Fifth
Amendment arguably could be obtained by methods not rising to the level of 'shock the
conscience,' it is difficult to conceive that the reverse could be true. Nor is there any case law
supporting that possibility" (citation omitted)).
44. Indeed, the Karake court, while criticizing the test and questioning its validity,
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Further, the test may, however unintentionally, raise the bar as to what constitutes a
voluntary confession; an additional inquiry into whether the conduct in question shocks
the conscience may have led one to believe mistakenly that particularly egregious
conduct is needed for a confession to be deemed involuntary.
The significance of the blurring of the lines between what "shocks the conscience"
under the Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence is relevant here and
requires some background. In the context of police investigations, the phrase was first
employed in the case ofRochin v. California,45 in which the Supreme Court overturned
the conviction of a defendant from whose stomach illegal narcotics had been forcibly
46
extracted as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rochin, dating from the era before the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were held
applicable to the states, stands as an example of the so-called "fundamental fairness"
inquiry into police action under the concept of "substantive due process," which has
been criticized by Professor William Stuntz as "thoroughly unlawlike. ' ' 7 However,
Rochin served as a central source of the law of search and seizure in the decade before
4
Mapp v. Ohio48 was decided.49
More importantly, the Supreme Court has recognized
that Rochin, were it decided today, would be subject to a Fourth Amendment analysis
under Mapp and its progeny.50 That the Fourth and Fifth Amendments operate
nonetheless chose (curiously) to make use of its terminology. Id. at 85-86 ("Indeed, based on

the totality of circumstances, the Court finds that the conditions under which defendants were
held at Kami and the abuse and mistreatment they endured while being interrogated shock the
conscience and therefore render the statements involuntary and inadmissible." (emphasis
added)).
45. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
46. Id.at 172 ("[Wle are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this
conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private
sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the
conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth
and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents-this course of
proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened
sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional
differentiation.").
47. William J.Stuntz, The PoliticalConstitution of CriminalJustice, 119 HARv. L. REv.
780, 822 (2006) [hereinafter Stuntz, The PoliticalConstitutionof CriminalJustice]; William J.
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure,105 YALE L.J. 393, 436-39 (1995)
[hereinafter Stuntz, Substantive Origins];see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392-94
(1989) (rejecting the notion that substantive due process claims involving executive action
should be governed solely by the "shocks the conscience" standard); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643,665 (1961) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that with respect to Rochin, "the practical result
of this adhoc approach is simply that when five Justices are sufficiently revolted by local police
action, a conviction is overturned and a guilty man may go free").
48. 367 U.S. 643.
49. Stuntz, Substantive Origins,supra note 47, at 441.

50. Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 n.9 (1998). It is of note that Justice Black, in
his concurring opinion in Mapp, remarked that Rochin presented an "almost perfect example of
the interrelationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 664.
However, Justice Black's opinion was not adopted in subsequent Supreme Court rulings and
was rejected by scholarly opinion. See Yale Kamisar, Mapp v. Ohio: The FirstShot Firedin the
Warren Court'sCriminalProcedure "Revolution, " in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 45, 51-52
(Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) ("Justice Black's theory of the exclusionary rule is badly flawed
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differently and protect
different rights is now axiomatic and cemented by Supreme
51
Court precedent.
In light of the above, several circuits will allow for the admission of evidence
obtained abroad in violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the search leading to
the evidence was legal in the country of origin and the evidence was not procured
under circumstances that shock the judicial conscience.5 2 This rule is in contrast to the
Fifth Amendment rule, under which the issue of whether the actions of foreign agents
are legal in their own countries has no bearing on the voluntariness of the confession
for constitutional purposes in the United States. 3 Therein lies the key difference
between the two amendments; where the Fourth Amendment rule requires that
evidence be obtained legally in a foreign locale, the Fifth Amendment rule demands an
inquiry into voluntariness of any statements to be introduced into evidence. The
addition of a "shock the conscience" test to the Fourth Amendment rule makes sense,
but its addition to the Fifth Amendment rule is less valid. Specifically, while a "shock
the conscience" test, however devoid of standards, might serve as an important barrier
to the introduction of, for example, any physical or wiretap evidence obtained by
dubious means, its importance is less obvious when a voluntariness requirement would
inevitably subsume it.

and, so far as I know, nobody subscribes to it today.").
51. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766-67 (2003) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment is violated at the time of the search or seizure, while the Fifth Amendment is
violated only when the tainted confession or statement is introduced at trial); Withrow v.
Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1992); Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontierof Constitutional
Confession Law-The InternationalArena: Exploring the Admissibility ofConfessions Taken by
U.S.Investigators from Non-AmericansAbroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 880-81 (2003) (stating that
where the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is judicially created, the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination serves as a constitutionally based exclusionary rule).
Note, however, the Supreme Court pointed out in Chavez-a civil action against a police
officer who conducted an allegedly coercive interrogation-that an inquiry into the

constitutionality of the means of interrogation, when statements made as a result of an allegedly
coercive interrogation are not introduced at trial, is subject to a substantive due process analysis.
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 773 ("Our views on the proper scope of the Fifth Amendment's SelfIncrimination Clause do not mean that police torture or other abuse that results in a confession
is constitutionally permissible so long as the statements are not used at trial; it simply means that
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than the Fifth Amendment's SelfIncrimination Clause, would govern the inquiry in those cases and provide relief in appropriate

circumstances.").
Professor Godsey has remarked that the Supreme Court's decision in Chavez, taken in

conjunction with its earlier ruling in Coloradov. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), has rendered
the due process involuntary confession test into a freestanding civil liberty, a violation ofwhich,
much like that of the Fourth Amendment, occurs at the time of the action in question. Godsey,
supra at 889-95. This is in contrast with a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, where a violation occurs only upon introduction at trial of the statements that were
the result of the allegedly coercive interrogation. Id.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Maturo, 982 F.2d 57, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1230-31 (11 th Cir. 1986); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120,
139 (5th Cir. 1976).
53. See United States v. Martindale, 790 F.2d 1129, 1132 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Covington, 783 F.2d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1985).
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As is the case under the Fifth Amendment, however, the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule does not apply to searches and seizures abroad precisely because it
has little or no deterrent value with respect to foreign law enforcement. 54 Whatever the
similarities and differences between the tests under the two amendments, however, the
application of the "shock the conscience" test in the Fifth Amendment policeinterrogation context by a few courts seems to have resulted from an unexplained
migration from the Fourth Amendment realm. 55 Indeed, the legal basis for excluding
evidence obtained abroad in such a manner has rarely been expressed; one of the
leading cases articulating the standard remarked that the court retained the authority to
exclude evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment under the supervisory
powers of the federal courts. 56 In the Fifth Amendment context, in light of the very real
question as to whether such a "thoroughly unlawlike" test adds anything at all to the
voluntariness inquiry, it does to appear a bit dubious when reviewing foreign police
interrogation methods.
C. Joint Venture
A key exception to the admissibility of voluntary statements made to foreign agents
is that if the confessions resulted from an interrogation that was run as a "jointventure"
between the United States and foreign law enforcement, Miranda warnings are
required lest the statements be suppressed. 57 The joint-venture analysis in the foreign
investigation context derives directly from a dynamic of cooperation between state and
federal law enforcement agencies, first addressed by the Supreme Court in the late
1920s. In that era, federal agents were using state law-enforcement officers to conduct
investigations so as to make an end run around constitutional protections that applied
to federal investigations, but not those of the states.58 The end result of this practice
was that federal officials could introduce evidence derived from state investigations in
federal trials, while state officials were free to introduce evidence illegally obtained by
federal agents. 59 This practice, also known as the "silver platter" doctrine, was

54. See, e.g., Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 (2d Cir. 1978).
55. United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 52 n.74 (D.D.C. 2006); see also Godsey,
supra note 51, at 891-92.
56. Morrow, 537 F.2d at 139; see also Godsey, supra note 51, at 893 n.239 (discussing
Morrow and explaining that courts may exclude evidence pursuant to such powers when the
Constitution does not apply).
57. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 229-30 (4th Cir. 2008) (the definition cited
here would include a formal type of joint venture, as well as one in which foreign lawenforcement officers act as "agents" of U.S. law enforcement), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312
(2009). Additionally, it should be noted that ajoint venture between U.S. law enforcement and
foreign agents constitutes an exception to the inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment overseas.
See, e.g., United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1091-93 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Behety, 32 F.3d 508, 510-11 (11 th Cir. 1994).
58. See Irvin B. Nathan & Christopher D. Man, CoordinatedCriminal Investigations
Between the United States and Foreign Governments and Their Implicationsfor American
ConstitutionalRights, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 821, 827-31 (2002) (discussing Byars v. UnitedStates,
273 U.S. 28 (1927), and Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927), as the first examples
of this analysis).
59. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); see also Robert M. Bloom & Hillary
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ultimately held invalid by the Supreme Court in 1960, particularly as it applied to the
search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment. 60 It is from this background

that the joint venture doctrine has come to apply in the international context, despite its
obsolete status in the domestic sphere, where constitutional protections now apply to
both state and federal investigations. The rationale behind the rule is that U.S. lawenforcement agents cannot make use of foreign agents to interrogate a suspect so as to
purposefully circumvent Mirandarequirements. 61 Thus far, federal circuit courts have
applied the joint venture doctrine and used the same criteria to determine the existence
62
ofjoint ventures under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
The joint venture doctrine requires "active" or "substantial" participation on behalf
of U.S. law enforcement, but only a few cases discuss those standards in any detail, and
each case is highly fact specific. 63 Further, scholars have criticized these standards as
"inappropriately" stringent, given that, in the context of joint federal-state
investigations, the Supreme Court required only some sort of participation by federal
officials in order for federal constitutional protections to apply. 64 In any event, despite
Massey, Accountingfor Federalismin State Courts: Exclusion ofEvidence ObtainedLawfully
by FederalAgents, 79 U. CoLo. L. REv. 381,386-88 (2008); Nathan & Man, supra note 58, at

831.
60. Bloom & Massey, supra note 59, at 386-87. The Court eliminated the practice
altogether by (1) "holding that evidence lawfully obtained by state officials pursuant to state law
was not admissible in federal courts when its collection violated the Fourth Amendment" and
(2) by making the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applicable to the states. Id.
61. Abu Al, 528 F.3d at 227.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2003) (Fifth
Amendment); Barona, 56 F.3d at 1092-93 (Fourth Amendment). The Ninth Circuit first
brushed up against the contours of ajoint venture analysis in Brulay v. UnitedStates, 383 F.2d
345 (9th Cir. 1967), but only applied the test under the Fourth Amendment, while subjecting the
statements made to the Mexican authorities to a voluntariness analysis. Id. at 347-49. The first
explicit application of the international joint venture test in the Fifth Amendment context seems
to have come in UnitedStates v. Trenary,473 F.2d 680, 681-82 (9th Cir. 1973), in which the
court applied the doctrine via a citation to a footnote in United States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d
585 (2d Cir. 1970), which noted that "[t]he presence of an American officer should not destroy
the usefulness of evidence legally obtained on the ground that methods of interrogation of
another country, at least equally civilized, may vary from ours." Trenary, 473 F.2d at 681-82
(citing Nagelberg, 434 F.2d at 587 n.1). In support of this proposition, the Nagelberg court
cited three cases involving an international joint venture analysis under the Fourth Amendment.
Nagelberg,434 F.2d at 587 n. 1.Additionally, Nagelberg is cited as the original authority for the
shocks-the-conscience exception under the Fifth Amendment and has been duly criticized as
inapposite. See United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 53 n.74 (D.D.C. 2006). Even so,
this blurring of the lines between the two amendments in the joint venture discussion can be
construed as less problematic than the similar ambiguity present in the shocks-the-conscience
analysis, if only because (a) there is no larger test, such as voluntariness, to subsume the joint
venture analysis, and (b) in both cases, the goal is to prevent United States law enforcement
from getting around the Constitution by using foreign law enforcement, whether by design or
otherwise.
63. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 14-15, 94 n.114 (discussing cases describing "active" and
"substantial" participation sufficient to give rise to a joint venture).
64. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,213 (1960) (holding that federal involvement
occurs where "federal agents had participated" in search); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74,
78 (1949) (holding that a federal official conducts a search "if he had a hand in it"); see also
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some initial resistance, 65 the "substantial participation" requirement is now routinely
applied, without controversy, in cases involving U.S.-foreign investigations.
By way of example, in UnitedStates v. Emery,6 the Ninth Circuit held that a U.S.foreign joint venture existed where U.S. agents warned their Mexican counterparts that
a drug deal was going to occur, provided surveillance on and personnel to the deal,
gave the signal to make an arrest, and then were present at the defendants'
interrogation in Mexico but did not provide Mirandawarnings. 67 On the other hand, in
United States v. Heller,68 the Fifth Circuit held there was no joint venture where
American involvement in the defendant's arrest by British authorities was
"peripheral. 69 While admittedly tipped off by an American official, the British agents
interrogated and charged Heller with violating British, not American, law, and an
American agent was allowed to interrogate him only for a limited time after receiving
permission from the British.70 Further, the American agent obtained two statements
after giving Heller his Mirandawarnings and "did not exchange information" with the
British officers "regarding their separate interrogations of appellant.",7' Likewise, in
UnitedStates v. Trenary,72 the Ninth Circuit found no joint venture when an American
agent, who did not identify himself as such, acted only as an interpreter for the
Mexican police in questioning the defendants. 73 While the above cases do not provide
clear standards to determine the existence of a joint venture based on substantial or
active participation, it seems relatively uncontroversial to conclude, as the Fourth
Circuit has, that, at a minimum, mere presence at a foreign interrogation, without more,
is insufficient to give rise to such an arrangement.74
D. The Extent of Miranda Abroad-The Embassy Bombings Case
While the above text details what is required to admit a foreign confession into
evidence in a criminal trial, a word is warranted about the limits of Mirandaabroad.
1. United States v. Bin Laden
In the trial of those accused of carrying out the August 1998 bombings ofthe United
States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, Judge Leonard
Sand of the Southern District of New York addressed the admissibility of statements
Nathan & Man, supra note 58 at 832-34 (noting also that "the application of the heightened
standard by the lower courts invites confusion").
65. See, e.g., Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1968) (Browning, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the doctrine allows federal officials to engage in activities that violate
the Fourth Amendment "so long as they do not participate too much").
66. 591 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1978).
67. Id. at 1268. For an example of a joint venture in the Fourth Amendment sphere, see
United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 488-90 (9th Cir. 1987).
68. 625 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1980).
69. Id. at 599 n.7.
70. Id.

71. Id.
72. 473 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1973).
73. Id.at 681-82.
74. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210,228-29 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct.
1312 (2009).
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made by the nonresident alien defendants to American law enforcement in the
aftermath of the bombings while the defendants were detained abroad in the custody of
foreign governments. 75 Rather than give Miranda warnings, the U.S. interrogators
initially gave what was deemed an "advice of rights" or "AOR" form to the defendants
being questioned.76 Initially, the court, in an opinion filed under seal, suppressed the
statements made to FBI agents by one of the defendants, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al'Owhali, a Saudi national, while in the custody of the Kenyan National Police." The
government moved for reconsideration of the decision and a hearing was held as to the
admissibility of the statements made in Kenya. 8
The court held Miranda applicable in the case of nonresident aliens being
interrogated by U.S. law-enforcement personnel abroad, 79 and its holding is worth
quoting at length:
Our analysis of Defendants' motions to suppress statements turns chiefly on the
constitutional standard we adopt today, as a matter of first impression, concerning
the admissibility of a defendant's admissions at his criminal trial in the United
States, where that defendant is a non-resident alien and his statements were the
product of an interrogation conducted abroad by U.S. law enforcement
representatives. We conclude that such a defendant, insofar as he is the present
subject of a domestic criminal proceeding, is indeed protected by the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, notwithstanding
the fact that his only connections to the United States are his alleged violations of
U.S. law and his subsequent U.S. prosecution. Additionally, we hold that courts
may and should apply the familiar warning/waiver framework set forth in Miranda
v. Arizona to determine whether the government, in its case-in-chief, may
introduce against such a defendant evidence of his custodial statements-even if

that defendant's interrogation by U.S. agents occurred
wholly abroad and while he
80
was in the physical custody of foreign authorities.
The court took great pains to emphasize that its ruling applied only when statements
taken abroad were intended to be introduced in a criminal trial in the United States, and
should not be taken to apply to interrogations made for the purpose of intelligence
gathering. 8' However, the court further remarked on the relationship of its holding to
the joint venture doctrine, noting that "the existence of the exception itself is based on
the assumption that Mirandamust apply to any portion of an overseas interrogation

75. United States v. Bin Laden (Bin Laden 1), 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(statements made by defendants Al-'Owhali and Mohamed); United States v. Bin Laden (Bin
Laden I1), 132 F. Supp. 2d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (statements made by defendant Odeh).
76. Bin Laden/, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 173-74, 180-81; Bin LadenfI, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 20205.
77. BinLaden I, 132 F. Supp. 2dat 171-72.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 181.
80. Id. (citation omitted). The court ultimately upheld the admission of statements made by
defendants Khalfan Khamis Mohamed and Mohamed Sadeek Odeb, while those of Al-'Owhali
were partially suppressed. Id. at 192-94; Bin Laden I, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 211-12.
81. Bin Laden I, 132 F. Supp 2d at 189 n.19 ("What we find impermissible is not
intelligence gathering by agents of the U.S. government empowered to do so, but rather the use
in a domestic criminal trial of statements extracted in violation of the Fifth Amendment.").
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that is, in fact or form, conducted by U.S. law enforcement," which "is perfectly
consistent with our holding today."8 2 In the end though, the court noted that the
government is not to be held to the letter of Mirandawhere such a situation would be
impossible, especially insofar as Miranda relates to the right to counsel. 83 In those
situations, the government must put forth its best efforts to learn the law in the foreign
jurisdiction governing the right of criminal defendants to counsel, and even advocate
that, if requested, counsel be appointed by the foreign government.8
2. The Second Circuit Opinion
In one of an exhaustive series of opinions upholding the convictions ofthe embassy
bombing defendants, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that "foreign
nationals interrogated overseas [by U.S. agents] but tried in the civilian courts of the
85
United States are protected by the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause."
Unlike the district court, however, it expressly declined to hold that Mirandaapplied to
overseas interrogations conducted by U.S. officials, but rather "proceed[ed] on the
assumption that the Miranda warning/waiver framework generally governs the
admissibility in our domestic courts of custodial statements obtained by U.S. officials
86
from individuals during their detention under the authority of foreign governments.,
In so doing, the Second Circuit ruled that U.S. agents operating abroad were not
compelled to give a verbatim recitation of the familiar Miranda warnings before
interrogating an individual.8 7
The Second Circuit expressly disagreed with the district court regarding the role
U.S. agents must play in conveying to a detainee his Fifth Amendment right of counsel
at the interrogation phase, since the right (or lack thereof) to counsel in a foreign
country is clearly not the same as if the interrogation were to take place in the United
States. 88 Specifically, in response to the district court's requirement that U.S. lawenforcement personnel learn the criminal procedure rules of the foreign jurisdiction
and urge that counsel, if requested, be appointed for a detainee, the court ruled that
Miranda"does not compel the police to serve as advocates for detainees before local

82. Id. at 187.
83. Id. at 187-89.
84. Id. at 189.
U.S. law enforcement can only do the best they can to give full effect to a
suspect's right to the presence and assistance of counsel, while still
respecting the ultimate authority of the foreign sovereign. And if an
attorney, whether appointed or retained, is truly and absolutely unavailable,
and that result remains unsatisfactory to the suspect, he should be told that
he need not speak to the Americans so long as he is without legal
representation. Moreover, even if the suspect opts to speak without a
lawyer present, he should know that he still has the right to stop answering
questions at any time.
Id.
85. United States v. Odeh (In re Terrorist Bombings) (In re TerroristBombings 111),
552
F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2008).
86. Id. at 203.
87. Id. at 204.
88. Id.
at 207-08.
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authorities."8 9 The court pointed out that even in the United States, police officers are
not required to advocate on behalf of suspects, and that the foreign arena should be no
different. 90 Finally, in response to the defendants' concerns that a failure to advocate
for the appointment of counsel, where it may lead to a detainee's refusal to speak to
U.S. agents, might also land the detainee in the position of being forced to speak to
foreign law enforcement, the Second Circuit noted that such a risk would exist even
when a U.S. agent attempted, without success, to secure counsel in a foreign
jurisdiction. 91

89. Id. at 208 (emphasis in original). This ruling corresponds to the prior scholarly criticism
of the Bin Laden I holding with respect to the applicability of Miranda abroad to nonresident
aliens in foreign custody. On the practical level, the criticisms centered on the unwieldy nature
of enforcing American constitutional rights in settings in which their applicability depends on
either the strictures of foreign law or the whims and predilections of foreign law enforcement
agents. See, e.g, M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of
Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.POL'Y 319, 347-51 (2003) [hereinafter Darmer, Beyond
Bin Laden and Lindh]; Mark A. Godsey, Miranda's FinalFrontier-TheInternationalArena:A
CriticalAnalysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposalfor a New Miranda Exception
Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1758-70 (2002); Godsey, supra note 51 at 854-55. On a more
theoretical level, there is the question of whether case law and legal doctrine support the
applicability of Mirandaand the due process voluntariness test to situations such as the one the
Bin Laden court faced, given that it is far from clear that the Fifth Amendment applies to
nonresident aliens interrogated abroad. See Godsey, supra note 51, at 867-96; see also M.
Katherine B. Darmer, Miranda Warnings, Torture,the Right to Counseland the War on Terror,
10 CHAP.L. REV. 631, 644-45 (2007). The theory that the due process voluntariness test does
not apply to non-Americans interrogated abroad by foreign agents stems from the Supreme
Court's ruling in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), in which the Court held that a
violation of due process demands some sort of state action the courts can hope to control, such
as an actual police interrogation. Id. at 165-66; see also United States v. Wolf, 813 F.2d 970,
972 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (questioning the continuing validity of the voluntariness test in light of
Connelly, but not deciding the issue). As a result, scholars have noted that the acts of foreign
agents would not constitute the type of state action required under Connelly,and any confession
obtained from a nonresident foreigner as a result of such an interrogation could be admitted into
evidence. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh, supra at 365-67; Godsey, supra note 51, at
882-95. While this criticism indeed raises legitimate concerns about the continuing viability of
the voluntariness test in such a context, especially given the Court's analyses in both Connelly
and Chavez, the lower courts have been uniform in continuing its application when faced with
evaluating the admissibility of confessions made to foreign agents overseas. Id. at 894-95.
Because it is unclear when this issue might be presented to the Supreme Court for resolution, the
continued viability of the test will be assumed, even concerning nonresident foreigners, whose
cases are not dealt with in any extensive detail in this Article. Moreover, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), the Bin Laden opinion has been
characterized as extending Miranda too far in too extraordinary a context. See Godsey, supra
note 51, at 895; Michael R. Hartman, Note, A CritiqueofUnited States v. Bin Laden in Light of
Chavez v. Martinez and the International War on Terror, 43 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 269
(2004).
90. In re TerroristBombings III, 552 F.3d at 208.
91. Id. (remarking also that the "risk of being forced to speak to their foreign jailors would
also exist, moreover, if U.S. agents were not involved at all").
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The net effect of In re TerroristBombings is that when conducting interrogations
abroad, U.S. agents are required to comply with the Fifth Amendment's right against
self-incrimination, although their duty regarding the right to counsel is limited to
conveying it to the detainee. While the specific legal issues presented in that case are
not the subject of this Article, both the circuit and district court opinions provide
several elucidating observations on the problems associated with foreign confessions.
Ultimately, despite all criticism, federal courts apply the voluntariness test in nearly
uniform fashion to analyze the admissibility of a confession taken abroad. However,
even in this narrow context, when put into practice, the voluntariness inquiry is
sufficiently malleable and in no way guarantees that a foreign confession admitted into
evidence is not the subject of coercion. Terrorism-related cases only serve to highlight
the concern about the test's ability to adequately gauge the involuntary nature of a
confession.
II. ABU AL1, ABU MARZOOK, AND THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF FOREIGN CONFESSIONS
Two relatively recent opinions92 in two separate cases provide insight into how
courts assess the admissibility of foreign confessions when faced with allegations of
coercive interrogations. That these opinions come in the context of terrorism
prosecutions in which the defendants are Arab Muslims alleged to have been active on
behalf of a specially designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) underscores the
need for legal tests and procedures that can adequately gauge the voluntariness of a
statement made abroad to foreign agents. Both cases involve Muslim-American
citizens of Arab origin interrogated abroad,93 so the concerns in In re Terrorist
Bombings with the constitutional rights of nonresident aliens do not figure greatly into
the discussion. The level of American law-enforcement involvement differs in each
scenario. While the Abu Ali case saw American law enforcement playing a role in the
interrogation conducted in Saudi Arabia, 94 there was no American role in Mohammad
Salah's interrogation at the hands of Israeli agents. 95A further important contrast stems
from the nature of the allegations. Both cases involved charges against individuals
suspected of being active in FTOs, yet where A bu Ali concerned an active terrorist cell
allegedly conspiring to directly attack American targets, 96 Abu Marzook involved an
individual who had been interrogated, charged, convicted, sentenced, imprisoned, and
finally released after serving a four-year sentence abroad prior to his return to the
United States to face charges rooted in the statements given over a decade earlier to
foreign investigators.97

92. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312
(2009); United States v. Abu Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
93. AbuAli, 528 F.3d at 221-25; Abu Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 712, 718.
94. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 227-30.
95. Abu Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 774.

96. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 224.
97. See Abu Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 712-13.
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A. The Abu Ali Case
1. Background
The first of the opinions involves Ahmad Omar Abu Ali, a United States citizen and
Virginia resident. 98 While a student at a Saudi university, Abu Ali was arrested in June
2003 by Saudi authorities in the wake of the May 2003 Riyadh suicide bomb attacks
that left nine Americans dead, on suspicion of being involved with an al-Qaeda cell.99
While in Saudi custody, during which time he was afforded neither the right to counsel
nor the opportunity to hire any,I°° he was interrogated and gave a series of
incriminating statements detailing his role in the cell's activities, which included its
plotting to commit attacks within the United States.101 Upon learning of his detention
and the incriminating statements Abu Ali made to the Saudi authorities, the FBI
requested that its agents be permitted to ask him a series of questions; they were
eventually allowed to observe Saudi agents interrogate him in a session that occurred
on June 15, 2003.102 The next month, Abu Ali confessed in writing to the0 Saudi
3
authorities and was subsequently videotaped reading his confession out loud.
Concurrent with Abu Ali's arrest in Saudi Arabia were the U.S. government's
efforts to prosecute several individuals who were active in his home mosque in
Virginia and whose activities had aroused the suspicions of the authorities in the wake
of September 11, 2001.1°4 The charges were rooted in allegations of providing
assistance to the FTO Lashkar-e-Taiba in military operations, which included actions
taken in conjunction with the Taliban against the United States. 05 The collective name
06
given to the group of about fourteen prosecutions was the "Virginia Paintball Case,"'
as a result of government allegations that those charged had trained for violent activity
by playing the game of paintball.10 7 One of the prosecutions involved a local imam
named Ali AI-Timimi, who was convicted of solicitation to levy war against the United
States, mostly based on sermons in which he spoke of the duty to fight American
troops in Afghanistan. 0 8 At one point, Abu Ali was a suspect in the Virginia Paintball
Case, 10 9 but he was never indicted in those prosecutions.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 343 (E.D. Va. 2005).
Id. at 341,343-44.
See id. at 356.
Id.at 341,343.
Id.at 343.
Id.
In September 2003, Abu Ali was interrogated by the FBI while still in Saudi custody
and made several incriminating statements without being apprised of his Mirandarights, but the
government declined to attempt to introduce those statements at his criminal trial. Id
104. See United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Chandia, 514 F.3d 365, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477,483 (4th

Cir. 2006).
105. Khan, 461 F.3d at 484. Lashkar-e-Taiba is active in Pakistan and focused on the dispute
over the Indian State of Kashmir. Id.
It is perhaps best known for its deadly attack on the Indian
city of Mumbai in November 2008. Lydia Polgreen & Souad Mekhennet, MilitantNetwork Is
IntactLong After Mumbai Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, at Al.
106. SeeAbuAli,395F. Supp.2dat356.
107. Khan, 461 F.3d at 483-84.
108. See, e.g., Wayne McCormack, Inchoate Terrorism: Liberalism Clashes with
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Over a year into his detention in Saudi Arabia, Abu Ali's parents filed a petition on
his behalf for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, essentially on the theory that their son was being detained by Saudi
authorities at the request of the United States government, although they also included
allegations of his being tortured by the Saudi authorities." 10 In response to the petition,
the government moved to dismiss on the theory that a federal district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider a habeas petition by a United States citizen detained by a
foreign government, but it made no factual contentions in opposition."' The district
court rejected the government's argument as far too broad, and denied the motion to
dismiss." 2 While this decision garnered scholarly attention for its ruling on a habeas
matter with serious implications for how the government can deal with terrorist
suspects abroad, 1 3 it did not serve to end the legal limbo of Ahmad Omar Abu Ali
himself, who remained in Saudi custody.
The district court also found the act of state doctrine, the political question doctrine,
and the separation of powers doctrine did not bar consideration of the petition, but that
any determination of whether Abu Ali was in the actual or constructive custody of the
United States-a threshold question as to jurisdiction-could not be addressed on a
motion to dismiss." 4 To resolve the issue of whether Abu Ali was in the actual or
constructive jurisdiction of the United States, and thus entitled to the protections of
habeas corpus, the court ordered discovery as to what the government's role actually
was in holding and detaining him in Saudi Arabia." 5

Fundamentalism, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-3 (2005); Elisa Kantor, Note, New Threats, Old
Problems:Adhering to Brandenburg's Imminence Requirement in Terrorism Prosecutions,76
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 752, 770-73 (2008) (discussing and critiquing AI-Timimi's prosecution as
not in accordance with the First Amendment's protections on freedom of speech).
109. AbuAli, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 356.
110. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28,30-31 (D.D.C. 2004). Apparently, Abu Ali's
father had learned of details relevant to his son's predicament through his employment at the
Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C. Id. at 33. For example, in a sworn affidavit
submitted by one of Abu Ali's attorneys, in response to concern about Abu Ali being tortured in
Saudi Arabia, a federal prosecutor "smirked and stated that 'He's no good for us here, he has no
fingernails left."' Id. at 36.
111. Id. at 37. The court asked the government to show cause as to why the habeas petition
should not be granted. Id. The government filed papers that it should be denied "as a matter of
law," but it "[did] not offer any evidence (or even contentions) rebutting petitioners' claims
regarding its role in the detention of their son." Id.
112. Id. at 40-41. Consider the court's reasoning in this regard, which echoes the concerns
of the joint venture analysis under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments: "The authority sought
would permit the executive, at his discretion, to deliver a United States citizen to a foreign
country to avoid constitutional scrutiny, or, as is alleged and to some degree substantiated here,
work through the intermediary of a foreign country to detain a United States citizen abroad." Id.
at 31.
113. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, DeconstructingHirota:
Habeas Corpus,Citizenship, and
Article I, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1532-35 (2007).

114. Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 57-65. The court also held that the Hostage Act did not
create a duty on the part of the President to demand the Saudi government to release Abu Ali.
Id. at 67.
115. Id.at68.
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Subsequent to the ruling-and according to Abu Ali's attorneys, perhaps even
because of it' 6 -a grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Abu Ali on a
series of terrorist crimes in early February 2005, and later that month, he was
extradited to the United States.' 17 He was ultimately charged with nine different counts,
including several related to providing material support to al-Qaeda, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B. 8 The most dramatic charge was a conspiracy to
assassinate the President of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1751, which
accompanied two other violent conspiracy charges involving airplane hijacking."l 9 A
glance at the superseding indictment reveals that the bulk of the evidence against Abu
Ali came from statements that he and other alleged members of the cell had given to
Saudi authorities, highlighting the importance those statements were to play in the
case. 120
2. Motion to Suppress Statements Made to Saudi Authorities
After hearing testimony from Abu Ali, American and Saudi security officials,
American consular officers, and medical experts for the government, Federal District
Judge Gerald Bruce Lee denied the motion to suppress the statements Abu Ali made to
Saudi officials in early June 2003, and ruled that those statements were admissible at
trial. 121 This ruling was upheld on appeal by a three-judge panel of the Fourth
Circuit.122 Abu Ali asserted that he was beaten, whipped, psychologically tortured, and

116. Eric Lichtblau, American Accused in a Plotto AssassinateBush, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,

2005, at Al ("'I suspect it's no coincidence that this man sat in detention for 20 months until a
federal judge in the United States was threatening to require the American government to
disclose its arrangements with the Saudi government for holding him,' said David D. Cole, a
Georgetown University law professor who is representing Mr. Abu Ali's family in the case. 'The
lawsuit gave the government a tremendous incentive to bring some charges."'); Josh Meyer,
Student Allegedly Talks ofAssassinationPlots, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at A 19 (stating that

Abu Ali's attorney "contended that the Justice Department only sought a grand jury indictment
against Abu Ali as a way of shutting down a civil lawsuit his family filed against the U.S.
government, alleging it was partially responsible for him being tortured and illegally detained
by Riyadh"). It should be noted, however, that Abu Ali's motion to dismiss on the basis of
prosecutorial vindictiveness on this point was dismissed United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp.
2d 338, 385-86 (E.D. Va. 2005).
117. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 225 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1312 (2009). Abu Ali moved unsuccessfully for a change of venue from the Eastern District of
Virginia to the District of Columbia, essentially arguing that the former, as an area where the
September 11,2001, attacks had taken place, featured ajury pool that was irretrievably biased
against him. See United States v. Abu Ali, No. CRIM A. 05-53, 2005 WL 2171448, at * I (E.D.
Va. Sept. 6, 2005).
118. AbuAli, 528 F.3d at 225.
119. Id.
120. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Abu Ali, No. 1:05CR53 (E.D. Va. Sept. 8,
2005); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Sept. 8, 2005) (on file with the Indiana Law
Journal).
121. United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 386-87 (E.D. Va. 2005).
122. AbuAli, 528 F.3d at 221.
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held without counsel during the period of interrogation in June 2003.123 It remains
unclear from the record in the case whether he was held pursuant to an American
request or at the behest of the Saudis, but at some point he was apprised of the
possibility of
being transferred to American custody and deemed an "enemy
124
combatant."'

a. Detention and Interrogation in Saudi Arabia
Prior to the suppression hearing, the court allowed for seven days of live testimony,
conducted via satellite videoconferencing, by the Saudi security officials involved in
detaining and interrogating Abu Ali. 125 Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Saudi officials were present in Saudi Arabia, where they were
allowed to testify under pseudonyms in the presence of prosecutors, defense counsel,
and an Arabic language translator.' 26 The judge, Abu Ali, other defense counsel, and
prosecutors were present in Virginia and observed the proceedings as they
happened,127 although there was no simultaneous telephone link between Abu Ali in
Virginia and his counsel in Saudi Arabia. 128 Apparently, this arrangement was
unprecedented in U.S.-Saudi relations, as it marked the first time that the Saudi
government had ever allowed access to officers of its security service, the29Mabahith,
although it would not permit them to testify in court in the United States.'
The Mabahith officers testified under the following appellations, Arresting Officer,
Lieutenant Colonel-Warden, Brigadier-General, and Captain.' 30 To a man, they all
denied that Abu Ali had been mistreated in any way during his detention and
interrogation at their hands. 13 1 Abu Ali testified that he was first beaten severely at the

123. AbuAli, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 367-71.
124. Id. at 354, 356.
125. Id. at 344.
126. Id.

127. Id.
128. See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 240 (4th Cir. 2008) ("Abu Ali was able to
communicate via cell phone with his defense counsel in Saudi Arabia during the frequent
breaks in the proceedings." (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1312 (2009).
129. Id. at 239. The Fourth Circuit identifies the Mabahith as "part of the Saudi Ministry of
Interior," whose "mission isto fight terrorism." Id. at 224 n.2. The United States Department of

State, in its annual report on human rights for 2003, the year Abu Ali was interrogated,
described the Mabahith as the "Ministry of Interior's security service." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2003: SAuDI ARABIA 2020,2022 (2003)

[hereinafter HUMAN

RIGHTS REPORTS

2003]. The most current report describes the Mabahith as

an "internal security police." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 2007: SAUDI ARABIA § 1.d (2007), availableat http://www.state.gov/g/drllrls/
hrrpt/2007/100605.htm [hereinafter HuMAN RIGHTS REPORTS 2007]. The word, in Arabic,
literally means "investigations." See HANS WEHR, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRrITEN ARABIC
42 (J.
M. Cowan ed., 3d ed. 1976).
130. AbuAli, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 345-47.
131. Id.Apparently, they had learned of Abu Ali's membership in the al-Qaeda cell under
investigation after interrogating one of its leaders, who identified him by photograph and code
name ("Reda"). Id. at 344. On that basis, all the government witnesses who testified, both Saudi
and American, averred that the decision to arrest Abu Ali was taken entirely by the Saudi
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last interrogation on the first day of his arrest and then again the next day when he was
132
struck repeatedly on his back by an unknown object while shackled to the floor.
After that, he agreed to cooperate with the Saudi authorities and was interrogated at
night for lengthy periods over forty-seven straight days.1 33 During this time, his
for effective consular assistance and access to a lawyer were denied or
requests 34
ignored.1

The FBI apparently learned of Abu Ali's detention on June 9, 2003, one day after
his arrest and nearly immediately requested access to the interrogation sessions. 35 The
Mabahith initially refused the request, but eventually they agreed to allow the FBI to
observe the sessions, which were conducted in Arabic, and even to ask questions
through the Saudi officers.136 The right to ask questions was not unfettered; out of
thirteen questions drafted by the FBI, the Mabahith asked only six and made clear prior
to any questioning that there were too many questions. 137 The testimony reflected that
the interrogation took place on June 15, 2003, and that Abu Ali did not appear to be in
any pain or discomfort, although he seemed to fidget a great deal. 138 Essentially, the
government witnesses described a relatively relaxed and nonconfrontational session
between Abu Ali and the Saudi officers. 139 The FBI agents testifying made clear that
they did not consider giving Miranda warnings at this point, since
140 they viewed the
matter as falling under the rubric of an "intelligence interview."'
The court observed the July 24, 2003, videotaped confession ofAbu Ali to observe
his demeanor alone, not for the content of the confession itself, and found that he
exhibited "noteworthy demeanor."' 4' Further, the court focused on some of the
statements and the actions of Abu Ali during the videotaped session and observed that
he was "under some stress." 14 2 He was not aware of the videotaping at the time and
made a few strange remarks or gestures that at the very least demonstrated that the
interrogations had psychologically affected him.

43

For his part, Abu Ali testified that

he was "going nuts" in the videotape, partially as a result of exhaustion at the end of
the forty-seven-day-long interrogation, and partially because the Saudi authorities
promised him a return to the general prison population from solitary confinement if he
read the confession.144
officials and was based on information generated solely by them. Id. at 344-49.
132. Id. at 367-69. He was also told that if he were found to be associated with the Riyadh
at 369.
bombings that his hand or foot might be cut off or that he might even be beheaded. Id.
133. Id. at 367-71.
134. Id.
135. Id.at 348-50.
136. Id
137. Id. at 349-50.
138. Id.at 348-51.
139. See id.
140. Id.at 349-50.

141. Id.
at 347-48.
142. Id.

143. See id.("In two instances, he exhibited unusual behavior. In one place, he
acknowledges receiving certain training to conceal his identity and he laughs and says

something to the effect of, 'Well, I guess that did not work out' or 'I guess we see how that
worked out.' Additionally, he was reading a statement when he spontaneously, without
direction, simulated cocking a weapon or automatic type rifle.").
144. Id.at 371.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 85:1

Abu Ali met on six occasions with a United States consular officer named Charles
Glatz, who testified that Abu Ali never complained about his treatment at the hands of
the Saudis (calling it "'excellent,' 'kind,' and 'humane'), appeared to be in good
physical shape, and showed no outward signs of mistreatment or discomfort. 45 Abu Ali
testified that he lied about the lack of mistreatment and tried to send a distress signal
but perceived some hostility from Glatz. 46 Certain aspects of Glatz's own testimony
spoke of a different situation, however. In their first meeting on July 8, 2003, one full
month after Abu Ali's arrest, Glatz was prevented by Mabahith officials from
discussing any aspect of the case with Abu Ali, from giving Abu Ali a letter from his
mother or a list of local Saudi attorneys, and from obtaining a Privacy Act waiver of
information so that Abu Ali's parents could learn of the consular visits. 147 A Mabahith
official was present for the meeting between the two and took active notes during their
conversation.148 While Abu Ali denied that he had been subjected to sleep deprivation,
he told Glatz that the Saudis kept the lights on twenty-four hours a day.' 49 In his
capacity as a consular officer, Glatz "could not secure a pen and piece of paper for
him, could not arrange a phone call, or get him a lawyer,
and so [Abu Ali] saw no point
50
in complaining to the consul about physical abuse."'
The period in which Glatz visited with Abu Ali spanned at least the first six months
of his detention, and "the biggest problem was that Mr. Abu Ali was being 'held
incommunicado,"' meaning "that even if he had a lawyer, under the Saudi system an
attorney could not have visited him during the investigation."''5 While it is unclear
from the opinion when the investigation actually ended, nothing in the record shows
that Abu Ali ever met with or was apprised of a right to meet with counsel while in
Saudi Arabia.' 5 2 The court found it significant that Abu Ali never complained to Glatz
about his treatment by the Saudis during the "couple of five-second intervals when he
and Mr. Abu Ali were alone and out of earshot of the Mabahith official observing the
meetings" on September 6, 2003, and October 6, 2003.1
Abu Ali did complain to Glatz about threats made to him by the FBI and the Secret
Service, in which they described his three options as cooperation and a life sentence in
Saudi Arabia, cooperation and joint prosecutions in Saudi Arabia and the United
States, or being declared an "enemy combatant" and imprisoned indefinitely without

145. Id. at 352-54. In February 2005, when Abu Ali was on the plane that was to take him
from Saudi Arabia to the United States, he told a different consular officer that "he wished he
had previously been able to tell him about his treatment in the prison, but that there had always
been a Saudi guard present," and that "[h]e did not say anything about being physically
mistreated, but said that he had not refused a consular visit, and that any Saudi claim that he had
done so was 'typical of the mind games' that they had played on him." Id. at 358.
146. Id. at 369-71.
147. Id. at 352-54 ("Mr. Abu Ali was instructed prior to the Consul meeting not to discuss
his treatment and not to sign anything concerning his rights.").
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 354.
151. Id. at 353.
152. See id. at 343-72; see also id. at 356 ("Agent Cole testified that Mr. Abu Ali did ask for
an attorney in their first meeting, but Agent Cole told him that he was not entitled to an attorney
in Saudi Arabia.").
153. Id. at 353.
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charge in the United States. 5 4 While Abu Ali was later interrogated by the FBI in
September 2003 for what was deemed intelligence gathering, those agents did not
provide him with Mirandawarnings or access to counsel and, as a result, did not seek
to introduce the fruits of those discussions at his criminal trial. 155 Both FBI agents
interrogating Abu Ali testified that he complained to them about being tortured by the
Saudi authorities but that he did not elaborate further on his statements.' 56 For his part,
Abu Ali testified that he complained to one of the FBI agents that he was being
mistreated and that when the agent reported his contention to the Saudi authorities,
Abu Ali was moved from his cell in the general population to one in solitary
confinement, where he was handcuffed to a chain hanging
from the ceiling and left
5 7
standing up through the night until the next afternoon.1
b. Medical Experts
The medical experts and related testimony in the suppression hearing presented two
different versions of Abu Ali's experience; the first being that he had been physically
tortured by the Saudi authorities throughout the lengthy interrogation process and, as a
result, suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and the second being that
he was not physically mistreated and did not legitimately suffer from PTSD.' 58 The
doctor who, on behalf of the government, initially examined Abu Ali (when he boarded
the plane that took him from Saudi Arabia to the United States) testified that he "said
nothing about any type of mistreatment, and that the only aspect of his confinement
that he described that could be considered psychological mistreatment was his having
been placed in solitary confinement."' 59 In his medical report, the doctor did not
remark on, nor have pictures taken of, the marks on Abu Ali's back, as he considered
them to be of no consequence and to be the type of mark he saw all the time, and thus,
they signified nothing.' 60 He also noted that he did6 not
examine Abu Ali for any signs
1
of torture and, accordingly, did not look for any.'
The government produced a second doctor to testify regarding the marks on Abu
Ali's back, and he concluded that those marks were not scars and consequently not the
result of any corporal punishment to which Abu Ali may have been subjected. 162 The
doctor did not have the benefit of conducting an exam of Abu Ali, but rather, he
reviewed the
report of Abu Ali's expert and photographs taken showing the marks on
63
his back.
Abu Ali's first expert witness was, like those of the government, a medical doctor
who conducted an exhaustive exam of Abu Ali while in pretrial detention in the United

154. Id. at 354. An FBI agent later confirmed this testimony. Id. at 356.
155. See supra note 103.
156. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 355-57. One of the agents approached the interrogation of
Abu Ali on the assumption that he was a "terrorist." Id.
157. Id. at 370.
158. See id. at 357-67, 371-72.
159. Id. at 357.

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 360-62.
Id.
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States.' 64 He testified that the marks on Abu Ali's back were, in fact, scars and were
consistent with being beaten and whipped.165 He further testified that Abu Ali was
physically mistreated on several occasions while in Saudi custody, in addition to being
psychologically abused. 66 This last assessment was based on the fact that Abu Ali was
kept in solitary confinement for lengthy periods, subjected to constant threats, and
repeatedly interrogated between 8:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. or 6:00 a.m. for lengthy
periods.167 Based on Abu Ali's experiences in Saudi detention, the doctor concluded
that he suffered from depression and the most severe form of PTSD.168 However, he
also testified that Abu Ali had a substantial amount to gain by lying to him
("malingering"), although in his experience very few victims oftorture did so. 6 9 With
respect to his conclusions, he "admitted that dermatology and psychology are different
fields from internal medicine."' 70 In addition, the doctor's background as an outspoken
advocate for victims of torture and his political activism (e.g., his lobbying Congress
against then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales on the issue of detainee abuse) seem
71
to have impacted his credibility as a witness, although to what degree is hard to tell.'
Abu Ali's second expert witness was an assistant professor of psychiatry at George
Washington University Medical Center who provided testimony in greater detail about
what she described as Abu Ali's severe form of PTSD. 172 She made her diagnosis on
the basis of three two-hour interviews she conducted with Abu Ali while he was
detained in the United States pending trial. 73 Her inexperience as an expert witness
seems to have made an impact,' 74 as the court noted she grew "quite defensive on
cross-examination and appeared to be a bit frustrated with the detailed questions about
her findings."'175 Her findings and methodology were challenged in detail, and she also
recognized that Abu Ali could be a malingerer.176 The government's psychiatric expert.
who examined Abu Ali over five sessions in September 2005, rejected Abu Ali's
expert witness' diagnosis of PTSD, finding that she erred in not relying on anything
other than her own reports and in ruling out the possibility of malingering too
77
quickly.

164. Id. at 362-64 (explaining that the doctor, certified as an expert in internal medicine, was
"Chairman of the Bellevue Commission for Victims of Torture" and "has taken courses and
seminars on treating victims of torture and routinely trains physicians in caring for victims of
torture").
165. Id. at 362.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 362-63.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 362-64.
Id. at 364.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 364-67.
Id.

174. See id. at 366 ("Dr. Gaby testified on cross-examination that she does not 'routinely do
this work,' and this was the first time she had examined someone charged with a felony.., in a
criminal case.").
175. Id.
176. Id. at 364-67.
177. Id. at370-71.
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3. Analysis of the Decisions
As noted, the district court denied the motion to suppress, specifically finding that
Abu Ali's statements were made voluntarily, 78 that he was not subject to treatment that
shocks the conscience,' 79 and that there existed no joint venture between the United
States and Saudi Arabia.' 8 0 All these rulings were upheld on appeal.' 8 ' While the
district court was faced with a difficult situation involving very serious charges,
allegations of torture, and contradictions between and within the witnesses' testimony,
these realities do not immunize either of the decisions from criticism, despite the
gravity of the court's predicament.
a. District Court Opinion-Voluntariness
The district court ruled, based on the totality of the circumstances, that Abu Ali's
statements were made voluntarily by a preponderance of the evidence. 8 2 It found the
testimony of the Saudi Mabahith officers to be credible, noting that the testimony of
the officer in charge of the detention facility in which Abu Ali was allegedly beaten
and whipped was unimpeached, while the testimony of Abu Ali raised questions as to
his credibility.8 3 Further, it remarked that Abu Ali's behavior during the time period of
June 11 through June 15, 2003, was inconsistent with a person having been tortured.184
Abu Ali's concern that the United States knew about his custody raised serious
questions as to whether he was tortured, since it raised the question why an allegedly
tortured85 detainee in a foreign country would not want the American authorities to
know. 1
As to Abu Ali's claims of torture, the court found that it was left with many
unanswered questions, but noted that if it had to base a decision solely on Abu Ali's
testimony, it would have found his statements to be involuntary.' 8 6 The court did not
accept the diagnosis of Abu Ali's medical experts because it was largely based on Abu
Ali's self reporting, and ultimately did not accept the PTSD diagnosis made by Abu
Ali's physicians.' 8 7 In the first instance, there existed a substantial dispute as to the
marks on Abu Ali's back.18 8 The disputed medical information coupled with the
assessment of the Saudi officials and Abu Ali's testimony favored the government's

178. Id. at387.
179. Id. at 381.
180. Id. at383.
181. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210,229-34 (4th Cir. 2008), cert.denied, 129 S.Ct.
1312 (2009).
182. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 378. The court also found that the statements were given
under conditions that did not shock the conscience. Id. at 380-81. The brief nature of the ruling
on this point underscores the somewhat superfluous role this test plays, as it did not seem to add
anything of note to the legal analysis.
183. Id. at 373-74.
184. Id. at 374.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 374, 376-77.
188. Seeid. at375.
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assertion of voluntariness. Additionally, the court's observation of Abu Ali led it to
question his reliability.'8 9 Specifically, the court's observation of Abu Ali revealed him
to be "intelligent, capable, and articulate," but the court also determined that his
testimony "[did] not flow logically."' 190 But, despite its denial of the motion to
suppress, the court did accept some of Abu Ali's assertions at face value and
acknowledged that it was 9left with questions as to Abu Ali's credibility based on the
testimony at the hearing.' '
The most glaring aspect of the opinion denying the motion to suppress the
confession concerns the court's assessment of the context in which those statements
were made-namely, Saudi custody. During the individualized inquiry into Abu Ali's
experience in Saudi Arabia, the court did not take into account what is publicly known
about interrogation at the hands of the Mabahith and other security forces, because
such evidence was not allowed by the court.192 Consider the Department of State's own
global report on human rights practices and its entry on Saudi Arabia for the year 2003,
when the bulk of the abusive treatment of Abu Ali allegedly took place. 193 It is worth
quoting from it at length to demonstrate what the same executive branch that was
prosecuting Abu Ali had to say about the Saudi security services detaining him:
[T]here were credible reports that the authorities abused detainees, both citizens
and foreigners. Ministry of Interior officials were responsible for most incidents of
abuse of prisoners, including beatings, whippings, and sleep deprivation. In
addition, there were allegations of torture, including allegations of beatings with
sticks and suspension from bars by handcuffs. There were reports that torture and
abuse were used to obtain confessions from prisoners (see Section i.e.). Canadian
and British prisoners that were released during the year reported that they had been
tortured during their detention.
The Government continued to refuse to recognize the mandate of the U.N.
Committee Against Torture to investigate alleged abuses. A government
committee established in 2000 to investigate allegations of torture still had not
begun functioning at year's end.194

The law provides that authorities may not detain suspects for more than 3 days
without charging them. However, in practice persons were held weeks or months
and sometimes longer....

189. Id. at 378.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. AMNESTY INT'L, THE TRIAL OF AHMED ABu ALl-FINDINGS OF AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL'S TRIAL OBSERvATIONs 4-6, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/
asset/AMR51/192/2005/en/dom-AMR511922005en.html.

193. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS 2003, supra note 129.

194. Id. at 2021.
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Political detainees who are arrested by the General Directorate of
Investigation (GDI), the Ministry of Interior'ssecurityservice (Mabahith), have
been held incommunicado in special prisons during the initial phase of an
investigation, which may last weeks or months. The95 GDI allowed the detainees
only limited contact with their families or lawyers.1

The court seemed to dismiss these claims by noting it was "mindful that there have
been news reports accusing the Saudi government of engaging in and condoning torture
or human rights violations."' 96 Were it simply a case of news reports, that would be
one thing; but the Department of State has gone on record with these statements, and a
reason does not immediately suggest itself as to why the government's own report
cannot be considered in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Indeed, on a motion
to suppress, hearsay evidence is admissible, and can be used to aid the court in making
its determination on the admissibility of a confession.197 Surely, consideration of this
evidence would require reconsideration of the credibility of the Saudi officers'
testimony, especially when one considers what they alluded to in their testimony. For
example, one officer "admitted that he has threatened an inmate before" and "once tied
a person to a tree for five minutes in connection with questioning."' 98 The main officer
questioning Abu Ali pointed out that while "he never used force on a subject,"
fortuitously "he has never had a suspect refuse to be questioned by him or to sign a
written confession statement log," and that "each person he questions confesses or
gives a statement."' 99
Had these statements been viewed by the district court in light of the State
Department's own report, perhaps they would have enhanced the court's totality-ofthe-circumstances analysis to one more reflective of the actual nature of interrogation
by the Mabahith in general terms. 200 Of course, Supreme Court precedent has held that
generalized evidence or statistics of disparate treatment fall short of proving any
constitutional violation in criminal prosecutions where no individualized showing is
made. A well-known example ofthis phenomenon is McCleskey v. Kemp,2° ' where the
Court rejected an equal protection challenge to Georgia's imposition of capital

195. Id.at 2022 (emphasis added).
196. United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 396 (E.D. Va. 2005).
197. FED. R. EviD. 104; United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667,679 (1980); United States v.
Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 50-51 (D.D.C. 2006).
198. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
199. Id. (noting that some of his testimony was "questionable").
200. Cf Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1238 (7th Cir. 1993) (ruling, in a § 1983
action involving allegations of police torture against members of the Chicago Police
Department, that district court committed error when it refused to allow the "plainly relevant"
testimony of two witnesses who claimed to have been tortured by a defendant for purposes of
proof of torture claim and to impeach the credibility of the same defendant). Note also that the
international human rights organizations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch made
this point in their reports on Abu Ali's case. See AMNESTY I Wr'L, supranote 192; Human Rights
Watch, Submission to the Committee Against Torture in Response to United States Positions
Expressed During the Committee's Consideration of the Second Periodic Report of the United
States on May 5 and May 8, 2006, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/relatedmaterial/hrw
response_051706.pdf.
201. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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punishment, based on a statistical study demonstrating that the death penalty was
disproportionately likely to apply to black defendants where the victim was white. 20 2 In
McCleskey, the Court ruled that absent a showing of discriminatory intent in the
defendant's own case, that is, that the state targeted him for imposition of the death
penalty on account of his race, there was no violation of equal protection. 20 3 Another
example is UnitedStates v. Armstrong,20 4 which saw the Supreme Court reject an equal
protection challenge to the prosecution of the defendant, based on unofficial statistics
that tended to show that no charges of crack distribution were ever brought in the
Central District of California against white defendants.2 5 Because there was no
showing of discriminatory intent toward the defendant himself, a selective prosecution
claim failed.20 6
Without debating the merits of the above cited decisions, it is not clear why the
Saudi internal security service should receive the same benefit of the doubt regarding
generalized reports or statistics as Georgia state20 7 and207
federal prosecutors, 208
respectively. A monarchy at the time of Abu Ali's detention, Saudi Arabia had a
human rights record that was, and still is, subject to severe criticism.

20 9

While in the

United States it is rare to find examples of courts presuming the existence of

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 291-99.
Id.
517 U.S. 456 (1996).
Id. at 463-71.
See id. at 470; see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 609-10 (1985) (stating

that even where a defendant can show a discriminatory effect of a particular policy, he still must
show that "the Government intended such a result," that is, it "prosecuted him because of his
protest activities" (emphasis in original)).
207. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296 n. 18 ("Our refusal to require that the prosecutor provide an
explanation for his decisions in this case is completely consistent with this Court's longstanding
precedents that hold that a prosecutor need not explain his decisions unless the criminal
defendant presents a prima facie case of unconstitutional conduct with respect to his case.").
208. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Federal prosecutors are respected

members of a respected profession. Despite an occasional misstep, the excellence of their work
abundantly justifies the presumption that 'they have properly discharged their official duties.'
(citation omitted)).
209. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS 2003, supra note 129, at 2020 ("Saudi Arabia is a
monarchy without elected representative institutions or political parties.... The Government's
human rights record remained poor; although there were positive improvements in a few areas,
serious problems remained. Citizens did not have the right to change their government. There
were credible reports that security forces continued to torture and abuse detainees and prisoners,
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and hold them in incommunicado detention. There were
cases in which [religious police] continued to intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens and
foreigners. There was no evidence that violators were held accountable for abuses. Most trials
were closed, and defendants usually appeared before judges without legal counsel. There were
reports that the Government infringed on individuals' privacy rights. The Government continued

to restrict freedom of speech and press, although there has been an increase in press freedom
over a series of years. The Government restricted freedom of assembly, association, religion, and

movement. Violence and discrimination against women, violence against children,
discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, and strict limitations on worker rights

continued.").
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prejudicial conditions, they do exist.2 10 Saudi Arabia's justice system, were it part of
the United States, would undoubtedly be considered unconstitutional on many levels of
theory and application. Further, the nature of the evidence in Abu Ali's case is also
different from that in McCleskey and Armstrong. Whereas in McCleskey the evidence
presented was in the form of a statistical study conducted by academics, 21' and in
Armstrong, in the form of affidavits by attorneys, newspaper reports, and unofficial
statistics, 2 2 here it bears repeating that the report relevant to Abu Ali's conditions of
detention came
from an agency within the same executive branch that was prosecuting
213
Abu Ali.
In finding his confession to be voluntary, the court managed to somehow elide
several key aspects of Abu Ali's detention and interrogation. Even assuming that his
allegations of torture2 1 4 and physical mistreatment were not sufficiently established or
were successfully rebutted, it was undisputed that Abu Ali was held for over a year and
a half without ever being charged, whether in the United States or Saudi Arabia. He
was not allowed to meet with an attorney during that time. Whatever meetings he had
with United States authorities were either custodial interrogations intended for
intelligence-gathering purposes, based on the FBI's view that he was a "terrorist," or
consular visits that were tightly controlled and observed by Saudi security. Where the
American consular authorities could not help him at all, the FBI informed him that
were he not to cooperate with their investigation, he risked being named an enemy
combatant by the United States and held indefinitely without charge. He was
interrogated for lengthy periods during the night hours over forty-seven straight days, a
situation that exhausted him. On this basis alone, and not denying the fact that Abu Ali
was considered by the U.S. intelligence community to be an individual with dangerous
associations, 2 15 it is hard to see how the district court could find his statements to have
been made voluntarily. While Abu Ali was not entitled to the exclusionary remedy
available for Mirandaviolations, Miranda'srationale is instructive in his case, since
the conditions of his interrogation appear to have had "no purpose other than to
216
subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner."

210. An exception to this general rule is stated in State v. Peart,621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993),
in which the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that, given the extremely high caseloads state
public defenders had to take on due to funding constraints, it would assume ineffective
assistance of counsel for any defendant represented by a public defender until the funding
problem was alleviated and caseloads reduced. Id. at 789-92.
211. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87.
212. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 459-61.
213. See supra text accompanying note 194.
214. The court provided a section in the opinion decrying the use of torture and noting its
illegality under United States law. United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338,379-80 (E.D.
Va. 2005).
215. In addition to being connected to the so-called Virginia Paintball case, see supra notes
105-09 and accompanying text, he was alleged to have been in contact with one of the
individuals who later committed the mass suicide attack inLondon, England, on July 7,2005, in
which fifty-six people were killed. RoN SusKIND, THE ONE PERcENT DocTRINE 201-03 (2006).

According to the emails, which were seized pursuant to the NSA's wireless wiretapping
program, the two were planning to commit violent activity. Id.
216. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966) ("The current practice of
incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's most cherished principles-
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b. Fourth Circuit Opinion-Voluntariness
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that Abu Ali's confession was
211
made voluntarily, deferring heavily to the latter's findings and determinations. While
the Fourth Circuit acknowledged Abu Ali's lengthy detention and interrogation
incommunicado, it also found that his "personal characteristics did not render him
particularly susceptible to coercion or pressure"218and that his conditions of confinement
were not onerous enough to overbear his will.

Leaving aside the issues surrounding the conditions of his confinement, the court of
appeals' analysis of Abu Ali's personal characteristics is not so clear cut as to be selfevident. While Abu Ali was undisputedly familiar with the Saudi agents on a cultural,
linguistic, and perhaps even a religious level, 219 it is not apparent why those traits make
him less, as opposed to more, susceptible to coercion. Given Saudi Arabia's human
220
rights record, an individual as "well-educated... intelligent, capable, and articulate"
as Abu Ali would almost assuredly know of the Saudi security services' reputation for
heavy-handed tactics in interrogation. Unlike the situation in the United States, where a
criminal suspect has Fifth Amendment rights but does not always exercise them for
various reasons, in Saudi Arabia, Abu Ali had no rights guaranteed to him and, based
on his character and background, likely had a significant fear that he might be tortured.
Taking its cue from Schneckloth, the Fourth Circuit's analysis is rooted in a standard
assumption taken from the American police interrogation context: namely, that the
more educated and sophisticated criminal defendant, with full awareness of his
constitutional rights, benefits from his refusal to cooperate with the police. In the Saudi
context, the opposite may in fact be true. In the latter situation, a suspect/detainee
might automatically conclude that some form of cooperation (whether based in fact or
fiction) is immediately necessary to avoid prolonged brutality. This is borne out by
Abu Ali's testimony that when he finally read his confession, he was acting "nuts" and
was completely exhausted by his interrogation, which lasted forty-seven straight
days.221
A second aspect of the Fourth Circuit's opinion that bears on the voluntariness of
Abu Ali's confession, but was stated in a separate context, concerns the format
governing the Saudi officers' testimony. As noted, their testimony came in the form of
depositions under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 conducted via two-way
videolink from Saudi Arabia, outside the physical presence of Abu Ali himself, and
under pseudonyms. 222 The court held that their testimony satisfied Maryland v.
CraigS223 two-part test for allowing the testimony to be taken outside the presence of a

that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective
devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement
obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.").
217. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210,231-34 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct.
1312 (2009).

218. Id.
at 233-34.
219. Id. at233.
220. Id.

221. United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 371 (E.D. Va. 2005).
222. Id. at 344.
223. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). In Craig, the Court held that "a defendant's right to confront
accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only
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criminal defendant, as224an exception to his rights under the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause.

Given the government's national security interest and the nature of the charges, the
first part of the test-to protect a compelling governmental interest-was easily
satisfied. 225 The second part was slightly more complicated, and focused on how to
secure the reliability of the testimony to be offered.226 As evidence of mechanisms to
ensure the reliability of the Saudi officers' testimony, the Fourth Circuit cited the facts
that the Saudi officers were administered an oath, that they were subjected to crossexamination, and that their testimony and the defendant's reaction to it were visible to
the jury on a split screen videotape. 227 While, as the Fourth Circuit noted, these
mechanisms ostensibly satisfy the second part of the Craigtest, some points regarding
each mechanism are worthy of further consideration.
First, the purpose of administering an oath is to impress the witness 'with the
seriousness of the matter and [to] guard[] against the lie by imposing the possibility of
a penalty for perjury. 228 This might be true in the context of criminal law enforcement
in the domestic arena,2 29 but an oath administered to unaccountable security officials in
a monarchy with no democratic institutions, no constitution, and no appreciation of the
constitutional rights enjoyed by the accused in the United States, does not inspire
confidence. Further, the decision to allow the officers' testimony via videolink from
Saudi Arabia in no way exposed these individuals to the perjury sanction. Because the
government of Saudi Arabia would not allow the Mabahith officers to leave the
country to testify, there is virtually no likelihood that they would be turned over to the
United States to face a possible perjury charge in the unlikely event that evidence of
such were able to be produced. While we may never know what actually happened
during Abu Ali's time in Saudi custody, and with all due respect to the district court's
observations of how the Saudi witnesses conducted themselves on the stand and its
crediting of their testimony, there was no impediment to their lying and getting away
with it. 230 Testimony given in such circumstances is inherently unreliable and should
not have been credited.
where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only
where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." Id. at 850 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988)).
224. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210,240-42 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1312 (2009).
225. Id. at 240 ("[T]he Supreme Court has long acknowledged that 'no governmental interest
is more compelling than the security of the Nation."' (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,307
(1981))).
226. Id. (citing Craig,497 U.S. at 850).
227. Id. at 241-42.
228. Craig,497 U.S. at 845-46 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
229. But see Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal
Rules that Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 851, 878 n.98 (2008) (citing
articles and statistics that note the very remote possibility of a perjury prosecution in any case).

230. In the United States, at least, police brutality is often accompanied by a willingness to
engage in perjury, on the rationale that the police's main goal of making arrests and fighting
crime somehow justifies abuse. See Susan Bandes, Patternsof lnjustice:PoliceBrutalityin the
Courts, 47 BuFF. L. REv. 1275, 1326-27 (1999). There are no doubt similar motivations for
foreign governments to hide or obfuscate their use of coercive interrogation techniques in
terrorism investigations from public scrutiny, and it is entirely possible to conclude that foreign
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c. Joint-Venture Analysis
The district court found that there was no joint venture between the FBI and the
Mabahith, nor did the latter act as the agents of the former for the purposes of
circumventing Miranda,a ruling that was upheld by a 2-1 majority of the three-judge
Fourth Circuit panel. 231 The dissenting judge felt that there was in fact ajoint venture,
but that, in any event, any error was harmless, given the voluntary nature of the
confession, and as a result was not grounds for its suppression. 232 Behind the two
positions were two different considerations. The court of appeals majority seemed to
be motivated by concerns that applying Miranda to the facts of Abu Ali would
interfere with international law-enforcement cooperation-most crucial in the war on
terrorisn--by forcing U.S. norms onto foreign countries, while the dissent noted that
once an American agent poses questions, whether directly or through a foreign officer,
233
that is the type of custodial interrogation governed by Miranda.
As the Fourth Circuit pointed out, there is little case law on what constitutes active
or substantial participation in the joint venture context. Again, there is no way to
determine the nature of the cooperation between the two agencies, American and
Saudi, on the date on which the Mabahith posed the FBI's questions; subsequently it
seems, however, that there was some sort ofjoint endeavor. When the FBI interrogated
Abu Ali in September 2003, they did so for allegedly intelligence-related purposes.
Criminal prosecution in the United States may have been foreclosed, but for the initial
confession given to the Saudis. The curious nature of Abu Ali's indictment, which
came a year and a half after his arrest in Saudi Arabia and a little over a month after an
unfavorable ruling for the government in his habeas petition, also gives credence to his
234
allegations that the Mabahith were acting at the behest of the FBI. How germane
these points are to the analysis seems secondary to the discussion the Fourth Circuit
panel was ostensibly having among its members. What emerges from the opinion is a
discussion of the nature of terrorist-related offenses, and whether or not they create a

intelligence agents might resort to perjury in due course. See Jenny-Brooke Condon,
ExtraterritorialInterrogation:The PorousBorderBetween Torture and U.S. Criminal Trials,
60 RUTGERS L. REv. 647, 694-95 (2008).
231. United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 381-83 (E.D. Va. 2005) (basing its
ruling on the fact that the Mabahith officers controlled all aspects of Abu Ali's detention and
interrogation); see also Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 229 n.5 (upholding the ruling on the same basis).
232. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 230-31 & n.6.
233. Id. at 230 nn.5-6. The dissent cited United States v. Bin Laden (Bin Laden I), 132 F.
Supp. 2d 168, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), with approval for the proposition that "Mirandamust apply
to any portion of an overseas interrogation that is, in fact or form, conducted by U.S. law
enforcement." Id. at 230 n.6.
234. In a recent article covering several of the decisions discussed here, Jenny-Brooke
Condon highlights the drawbacks of the limited and narrow joint venture analysis conducted by
the district court in Abu Ali, and argues persuasively for a more rigorous review that
"consider[s] the government's inclination and incentives to circumvent U.S. law and the high
degree of transnational cooperation and facilitation in prosecuting the war on terror." Condon,
supra note 230, at 700-01, 704 ("If courts continue to employ insufficiently skeptical analyses
of confessions and the role ofU.S. actors inforeign investigations abroad, they will unwittingly
create a perverse incentive for the U.S. government to export its intelligence and evidence
gathering to foreign entities that torture.").
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special legal regime that is less protective of constitutional rights than what might be
deemed "ordinary" crimes.
4. Sentencing
After Abu Ali's conviction, 235 the district court sentenced him to a thirty-year term
of imprisonment, followed by a thirty-year period of supervised release. 236 The
government had argued for a life sentence, based on the Sentencing Guidelines
calculation, but the district court demurred, finding:
Abu Ali never planted any bombs, shot any weapons, or injured any people, and
there is no evidence that he took any steps in the United States with others to
further the conspiracy." The court also commented on the defendant's lack of a
prior criminal history and his good behavior while incarcerated in the United
States.237
A majority of the Fourth Circuit panel overturned the sentence as too great a
variance from the guidelines and remanded for resentencing, impliedly asking the
district court to think more seriously about imposing a life sentence. 238 The dissent
took the position that the majority, in remanding, failed to apply Supreme Court
precedent and created, in effect, a kind of terrorism exception to allow for a less
deferential review of the district court's sentencing decision. 39
In reflecting on the voluntariness analysis employed in both Abu Ali decisions, it
seems that some form of terrorism exception had to have been in effect. Consider the
Fourth Circuit majority's comments in evaluating the district court's sentence:
We are similarly unmoved by the district court's (and dissent's) references to
letters describing Abu Ali's "general decent reputation as a young man" and his
overall "good character." What person of "decent reputation" seeks to assassinate
leaders of countries? What person of "good character" aims to destroy thousands
of fellow human beings who are innocent of any transgressions against him? This
is not good character as we understand it, and to allow letters of this sort to
provide the basis for such 24a substantial variance would be to deprive "good
character" of all its content. 0
Using this sort of moralistic logic to justify imposition of more severe penalties
because the underlying crime involves terrorism and national security might be

235. To underscore the importance of Abu Ali's conviction, in a recent article former
Attorney General John Ashcroft highlighted it as a notable "success []in the War on Terror."
John Ashcrofi, Reflections on Events and Changes at the DepartmentofJustice, 32 HARv. J.L.
& PUB.POL'Y 813, 828-29 (2009).

236. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 259 (4th Cir. 2008).
237. Id. (quoting United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338 (E.D. Va. 2005)).
238. See id. at 269.

239. Id.at 271-82 (Motz, J., dissenting) ("The majority seems to believe that the particular
context of the sentence in this case, involving as it does terrorist crimes, renders appropriate
some form of special-and less deferential-review.").
240. Id. at 268 (citation omitted).
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understandable, if not expected, in such a case. Whatever its merits or demerits, it is a
short leap to employ the same logic in assessing the voluntariness of Abu Ali's
confessions. If Abu Ali can be characterized in such negative and dangerous terms, an
application of the voluntariness test can easily result in a finding that a confession was
voluntary, simply by virtue of a hostile or unsympathetic judge guiding the facts of the
voluntariness test to a conclusion he or she desires. Criticism of the voluntariness test is
well-known; the test is particularly susceptible to judicial manipulation, as previously
indicated. 241 Hostility and bias in this form toward a criminal defendant probably
colored the analysis in the Abu Ali decision, because the evidence of Saudi misconduct
was available had the courts actually wanted to hear and process it. In any event, at
resentencing, the district court accepted the Fourth Circuit's logic and sentenced Abu
Ali to life in prison.242
B. The Abu Marzook Case
The case of United States v. Marzookl43 presents the second recent instance of a
federal prosecution involving the introduction of a confession made abroad to foreign
agents. Muhammad Salah, one of the defendants in the Marzook prosecution, was
arrested by Israeli military authorities upon trying to enter the Gaza Strip in January
1993.2u Salah, a naturalized American citizen of Palestinian origin, gave a series of
statements to the Israeli authorities that incriminated him as a high-level operative in
the Islamic Resistance Movement, better known as Hamas. 245 As a result of his
confession, Salah eventually pled guilty to "being an active member of, holding office
in, and performing services for an illicit organization (Hamas), engaging in activity
against the public order and undermining regional security, and providing shelter to
terrorists."'246 During his period of incarceration in Israel, which lasted until November

241. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. For another example of a type of
terrorism exception in application, see United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 327, 354-56
(4th Cir. 2004) (upholding 155-year prison sentence to defendant found guilty of providing
material support to Hezbollah, a banned FTO, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B), overruledby
Hammoud v. United States, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005). See also Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 371-85
(Gregory, J., dissenting) (discussing the weakness of the evidence and general excessiveness of
the sentence).
242. Jerry Markon, Fall'sChurch Man's Sentence in TerrorPlotIs Increasedto Life,WASH.
POST, July 28, 2009, at A3.

243. United States v. Marzook (Marzook IV), 435 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ill. 2006). On a
side note, although the named defendant is sometimes referred to simply as Marzook, in point of
fact his last name is Abu Marzook. See, e.g., United States v. Marzook (Marzook 111),
426 F.
Supp. 2d 820 (N.D. Ill. 2006); United States v. Marzook (Marzook 1), 383 F. Supp. 2d
1056 (N.D. I11.
2005). This practice, which is not unheard of in the federal terrorism cases, is
akin to referring to someone with the last name of Johnson as "John." For the purposes of this
Article, reference will be made to the names as officially recorded, regardless of whether they
are correctly rendered.
244. Marzook IV, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
245. Id.; see also Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief& Dev., 511 F.3d 707,712 (7th Cir.
2007), vacated, reh 'gen banc granted,2008 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *1(7th Cir. June 16, 2008),
modified, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Boim v. Salah, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009).
246. Boim, 511 F.3d at 712.
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1997, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department 247
listed
him as a specially designated terrorist, a classification that endures to this day.
1. Motion to Suppress
In August 2004, Salah was indicted, along with Abu Marzook, 248 the deputy head of
the political wing of Hamas, and Abdelhaleem Ashqar on three charges: a Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy charge in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d), one charge of knowingly providing material support to a banned
FTO in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, and one charge of obstructing justice by
providing false information in a civil action in which the family of an American citizen
killed in a Hamas shooting in the West Bank sued individuals and corporations they
believed to be associated with Hamas. 249 Crucial to the government's case were the
statements that Salah allegedly made to the Israeli authorities while in custody between
January and March 1993, and
consequently he moved to suppress their admission as
250
being the product of torture.

247. Id.; OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, SPECIALLY
DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS 324 (2009), availableat http://www.treas.gov/

offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/tllsdn.pdf. Salah was the first American citizen to be so
designated. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on
Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 28 (2003).
248. Abu Marzook's saga in the federal courts of the United States prior to the filing of
charges in the Northern District of Illinois is noteworthy in its own right, even though he was
indicted in absentia and did not appear in the action in which Salah and Ashqar were tried. In
July 1995, Abu Marzook, the then-head of the political wing of Hamas and a former United
States permanent resident, was detained by U.S. immigration authorities while trying to enter the
country at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Marzook v. Albright, No. 97
CIV. 2293, 1997 WL 181163, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1997); Marzookv. Christopher, No. 96
Civ. 4107, 1996 WL 583378, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1996). He then spent two years in
detention and unsuccessfully fought off a challenge to his being extradited to Israel to face
murder charges on account of his being a leader of Hamas. In re Extradition of Marzook, 924 F.
Supp 565, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). One former Central Intelligence Agency officer claimed that
the agency, with the aid of the FBI, manipulated Abu Marzook into traveling to the United
States, so that he might be detained for unrevealed intelligence purposes. MELISSA BOYLE
MAHLE, DENIAL AND DECEPTION: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE CIA FROM IRAN-CONTRA TO

9/11, at

246 (2004). In April 1997, Israel withdrew its extradition request, even after Abu Marzook had
indicated his willingness to be tried there, and he was subsequently deported to Jordan. Neil
Macfarquhar, TerrorSuspect Freedby U.S.; Fliesto Jordan,N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1997, at A 1.
249. Second Superseding Indictment of Muhammad Hamid Khalil Salah at 20, United States
v. Marzook, 462 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No. 03CR978); Boim, 511 F.3d at 713.
250. United States v. Marzook (MarzooklV), 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 712-13 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
Specifically, Salah alleged that he was
beaten, subjected to physical pressure, stripped naked, handcuffed in an
interrogation room for long periods of time, threatened with taking pictures
of him naked, forced to sit in a low child's chair, slapped, left for long
periods of time in a tiny freezing cell, denied sleep for long periods of time,

subjected to having a foul smelling sack placed on his head for long periods
of time, subjected to deafening loud music, forced to sleep on a cold floor
for long periods without a mattress or blanket, placed in dark cells,
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At the hearing on the motion to suppress, United States District Judge Amy St. Eve
heard testimony from Salah's primary Israeli interrogators, several FBI agents, and
Salah's own witnesses."' Salah himself did not testify, but submitted an affidavit in
which he set forth his allegations of abuse. 252 The agents from the Israel Security
Agency (ISA), formerly known as the General Security Service (GSS), were allowed,
pursuant to the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), to enter the courtroom
through a separate entrance, testify in a closed session, and have their identities kept
secret, on the basis that such information was classified in Israel and would be treated
as such by the United States.253
While the ISA agents did not deny that they used the coercive practices described in
Salah's allegations in the normal course of interrogating Palestinian detainees, they
denied having employed them in Salah's case specifically. 254 To buttress this point, the
officer supervising Salah's interrogation pointed to an order issued by the then-head of
the GSS that allowed for only "frontal interrogation," that is, questioning of Salah, and
not the techniques available to GSS agents generally, on account of his American
citizenship.255 In the course of extensive testimony by the Israeli agents, it was made
clear that Salah was not provided an attorney upon request, since Israeli law did not
allow him one for a period of at least fifteen days, and, regardless, the interrogation
could, and in this case did, continue even after counsel was appointed.256 While he was
tried in an Israeli military court and not in the civilian court system, it was unclear from
the record as to exactly when he received an attorney, though the court noted that
appointment of counsel did take place within the time period allowed for by Israeli
law. 2 57 In any event, the ISA agents' testimony set forth in detail their version of the
investigation, and they produced evidence in the form of logs, detailed reports, and
transcripts of sessions to buttress the government's contention that Salah's statements
were made voluntarily.
Well over a month into the interrogation, Salah was placed in a cell at a new facility
with Palestinians collaborating with the ISA. Salah alleged that these collaborators
coerced him via threats to write down a lengthy statement, essentially confessing to a
series of crimes involving his activism on behalf of Hamas. 258 The fifty-three page
statement was the most extensive explication of Salah's alleged illegal activities and
threatened with violence, threatened with murder, threatened with harm to
his family through the FBI, threatened with long detention without being
brought before ajudge, threatened with long prison sentences, denied food,
clothing, or worship, or subjected to extreme heat and cold.
Id. at 718.
251. Id. at 714.
252. Id. For an explanation of the incentives a criminal defendant enjoys not to testify on his
own behalf, see Bellin, supra note 229.
253. United States v. Marzook (Marzook I), 412 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. I11.2006).
254. MarzookIV, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 718; see also United States v. Salah, 462 F. Supp. 2d
915, 917-18 (N.D. I11.2006) (stating that the government admitted that ISA used the following
methods during the time period in question: hoods, handcuffs, shackles, handcuffing a detainee
to a small chair while hooded, threatening harm to detainee and his family, sleep deprivation,
and, under certain circumstances suggesting an imminent threat to human life, slapping).
255. MarzookIV, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 717-18.
256. Id. at 759-60.
257. Id.; see also id. at 734-36.
258. Id. at 721-22, 766-70.
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subsequently led to his confessing orally before the ISA agents, who tape-recorded his
statements. 259 Unlike Abu Ali, Salah never testified at the suppression hearing, and
instead relied only on the affidavit he had executed in support of his motion to
suppress. 26 0 The government nonetheless introduced evidence that it claimed
undermined Salah's credibility, concerning a false loan application he had previously
completed.26' Salah's expert and fact witnesses testified generally about Israeli
interrogation techniques as applied to Palestinians, but the court did not seem to give
them much credit, because (1) those witnesses were not present at Salah's
interrogation,262 and (2) their investigations of Salah's allegations were either cursory
or nonexistent. 263
Ultimately, the court ruled that all of the statements but one Salah had made while
in custody were not the product of torture, and could be introduced into evidence at his
criminal trial. 264 The sole exception was a set of signed statements made to an Israeli
police officer that were written in Hebrew, a language that Salah did not read or
understand.265
2. Abu Marzook-Analysis
The court approached the question of voluntariness by analyzing (1) the conduct of
the ISA agents, (2) the conditions of the interrogation, and (3) the personal
characteristics of Salah.266 The court found neither the agents' conduct nor the
conditions of the interrogation to have been coercive, and it noted that Salah was
"intelligent and articulate." 267 Given that many of the issues raised in the Marzook
decision are similar to those in Abu Ali, repetitive commentary is unnecessary at this
stage. However, there are certain points particular to the facts in Marzook that invite
further analysis, and they are set forth below.
The decision rested primarily on the court's finding that the main ISA interrogators
were credible in their respective testimony, which collectively reinforced the
government's argument that the statements were made voluntarily. The court noted
explicitly that Salah's decision not to testify clearly impacted its decision to deny the
motion to suppress, although given the court's generally favorable impression of the
ISA agents' testimony, it appears unlikely to have made any great difference. Of
particular importance was the court's acceptance of the testimony that at the time of

259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 766-70.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 737-39.
Id. at 760. The evidence revealed that Judith Miller, then a reporter for the New York

Times, was the only individual not employed by the Israeli authorities to have witnessed a
session of Salah's interrogation. See id. at 721, 774. In fact, she not only witnessed a portion of
the interrogation, but also was allowed to ask clarifying questions of Salah through the ISA
interrogator. Id. at 721. Apparently, the GSS permitted this arrangement as a tactic "to convince
the FBI that terrorist activities were taking place in America of which they were unaware." Id.
263. Id. at 760.
264. Id. at 777.
265. Id.at 762-64.
266. Id. at 741-43.
267. Id. at 753.
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Salah's interrogation, the supervisory agent had been given an order originating from
the head of the GSS that Salah was to be treated differently on account ofhis American
citizenship. Like Saudi Arabia in the Abu Ali decision, however, Israel in 1993 had
been the subject of a State Department report on human rights that found that
"intornational [sic], Israeli, and Palestinian human rights groups and diplomats
continued to provide detailed and credible accounts of widespread abuse, which they
claim in some cases amounted to torture, of Palestinian and Palestinian-American
detainees, both immediately after arrest and during interrogation.' 268 Clearly, there is a
discrepancy between the State Department's own report and the ISA agents' testimony.
The only version of the alleged GSS order was testimonial. Had the State Department
report been part of the record, perhaps the court might have been more critical in its
assessment of the agent's testimony on this point. At least the State Department report
may have forced the government to try and introduce written documentation of the
GSS order, if any such evidence existed. Part of the testimony in the record reflected
an admitted historical pattern of GSS agents lying to Israeli courts up to 1987.269 When
coupled with the State Department's own report, a totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis might lead to the opposite conclusion than the one the court ultimately drew.
At the very least, the report should form part of the analysis.
The vagaries of the voluntariness analysis were on full display with respect to the
statements of Salah regarding the body of an Israeli soldier who had presumably been
killed by Hamas and buried in an undisclosed location. 270 Salah and his interrogators
wrote out an agreement whereby he and a number of female Palestinian prisoners
would be released, along with the return of $96,000 which was seized from Salah at the
time of his arrest, if he led them to the soldier's burial site. 271 The court allowed
evidence of the statements, the agreement, and a map drawn by Salah of the supposed
location of the body. The only problem with this evidence was that it did not accurately
reflect where the body was buried, even though Salah accompanied the GSS agents on
a search for the body around the time of his interrogation. 272 Although the body was
not recovered until sometime in 1996, the court credited the ISA agent's testimony as
demonstrating Salah's knowledge of the burial location, and, as a result, the motion to
suppress this evidence was denied. 3
One can view this testimony in two diametrically opposed ways. First, it could be as
the ISA agent said; namely, that Salah did know of the body's location, which serves as
evidence of his high-level Hamas connection, but made a minor mistake regarding only
one junction, an irrelevant point in light of the bigger picture. Second, it could also be
just as Salah averred; namely, that he came up with the idea of the agreement under
coercion as a tactic to obtain his own release after many days of harsh interrogation.
The outwardly credible testimony of an intelligence agent employed by a friendly
country is juxtaposed against the assertion of a Palestinian-American Muslim, who has

268.
ISRAEL
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS PRAcTICES FOR 1993:
1204 (1994) [hereinafter HuMAN RIGHTS REPORTS 1993] (emphasis added).
MarzookIV, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
Id.at 720-21.
Id. at 720, 765-66.
Id. at 720-21.
Id. ("'I am convinced that Muhammad Salah was seriously willing to help us find the

body. He just made a mistake with regards to the junction, that's all."'); see also id.
at 765-66.
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already been declared a specially designated terrorist by the U.S. government, and is
on trial for committing very serious terrorist crimes. Under the voluntariness test, a
judge is entirely free to choose whichever of these two narratives suits the judge's own
personal prejudices and predilections. Regardless of the outcome, the test does not
serve to predict with any regularity how a judge makes a determination in such a
situation.
A particularly troubling aspect of the court's decision concerns the fifty-three page
handwritten statement made by Salah to Palestinian collaborators working for the ISA
in which he detailed his alleged activities on behalf of Hamas at great length. Salah's
ISA interrogators decided to have him placed in a cell with these collaboratorsPalestinians serving time for low-level, nonviolent crimes-because they were
unsatisfied with the level of information he had furnished them so far, over a month
into his interrogation. While Salah claimed in his affidavit to the district court that he
was subject to abuse and severe threats to his person from these collaborators, also
known as the "birds, 274 the court pointed out the contradictory positions and
statements he had made in the past regarding this episode. These contradictions,
coupled with the ISA agents' testimony that the birds did not abuse Salah, effectively
ended the inquiry on this matter, even275though the government failed to put any of these
collaborators on the stand to testify.
The birds' tactic begs the question as to how such behavior can be found not
coercive and in line with Supreme Court precedent on voluntariness, among other tests.
Consider the facts of Arizona v. Fulminante,276 one of the two post-Mirandacases in
which the Supreme Court invalidated a confession as being involuntary.2 7 7 Fulminante,
a suspect in the killing of his eleven-year-old stepdaughter in Arizona, was imprisoned
on unrelated federal charges in New Jersey. 278 While imprisoned, a paid FBI informant
befriended Fulminante and inquired about the murder of the latter's stepdaughter.279
After Fulminante repeatedly denied involvement with the crime, the informant told the
FBI, which requested that he find out more about the matter. 280 The informant then
proceeded to offer Fulminante protection from threats he had been receiving in prison
stemming from his perceived identity as a child murderer, but only if Fulminante came
clean about his role in the murder. 281 Fulminante confessed to the informant, and the
confession formed the basis of his murder trial in Arizona, at which he was convicted
and received a sentence of death.282 The Supreme Court ruled that Fulminante's

274. In the Palestinian dialect of the Arabic language, the use of the word "aSafeer," which
means "little birds" or "sparrows," may be used in an appropriate context to connote spies. This
is no doubt the intention behind the use of this term by both Salah and the ISA agents.
275. MarzookIV, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 769 ("Contrary to Defendant's assertion, the failure to
call any of the 'birds' as witnesses at trial does not require the suppression of Salah's
handwritten statement.").
276. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
277. See Seidman, supra note 35, at 745.
278. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 282.
279. Id. at 282-83.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 283.
282. Id. at 283-84.
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confession was involuntary, as it was the result of an offer of protection from threats of
violence.283
Specifically, the Court "made clear that a finding of coercion need not depend upon
actual violence by a government agent; a credible threat is sufficient." 2 84 In Marzook,
the district court dismissed the argument that the written statement Salah made while
engaged in the bird operation was the product of coercion. The court noted that Salah
did not complain about any coercion to the ISA agents, to the Israeli military court, or
to his lawyer at the time, and that contemporaneous medical records reflected no marks
or scars of physical abuse or mistreatment. 285 Indeed, the court went so far as to remark
that given the relationship between Salah and his lead interrogator, he would assuredly
have complained about any mistreatment had any really occurred.28 6 Further
complicating matters for Salah was the fact that his affidavit in support ofthe motion to
suppress alleged physical abuse at the hands of the birds, while an earlier affidavit he
submitted in the Abu Marzook extradition saga2 87 alleged only threats of physical
abuse.288
With respect to the discrepancies pointed out by the court, the notion that an
individual under interrogation by a hostile foreign agency should be prejudiced if he
fails to complain about any alleged abuse seems both an unfair and unrealistic
expectation. Even despite this assertion, at the very least there seems to be some
dispute as to a material fact regarding what occurred when Salah was with the birds.
Both of Salah's affidavits referenced in the opinion discuss either threats of abuse
and/or actual abuse by these individuals, a situation that should give rise to some
concern about the method in which the written statement was obtained. Resolving the
matter without so much as having any of the birds testify appears to contravene
Fulminante's holding on voluntariness, which is rooted in a factually analogous
situation, to a certain degree. 28 9 The fact that the court also precluded crossexamination of the ISA on classified grounds regarding the bird operation and its
details also renders its analysis incomplete in light of Fulminante.29° At the very least,
before denying the motion to suppress, the court should have heard more testimony

283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 287-88.
Id.
at 287 (citations omitted).
United States v. Marzook (MarzookIV), 435 F. Supp. 2d 708,767-69 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
Id. at 767-68.

287. See Marzook v. Christopher, 96 Civ. 4107 (KMW), 1996 WL 583378, at *5 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1996).
288. MarzookIV, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 768-69.
289. Where Fulminante admittedly received threats and then traded a confession for
protection, Salah allegedly felt threatened by the birds and confessed to appease them, so the
situations are not factually identical. However, both cases involve fact patterns in which a
confession is made under threat of violence, a quintessentially "involuntary" circumstance.
290. See Defendant Salah's Motion to Set Aside the Court's Decision on His Motion to
Suppress and to Reassign Case to Another Judge for a De Novo Hearing 6,United States v.
Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No. 03 CR 978) ("[AII questions about the
'Birds' (Palestinian collaborators who tortured Mr. Salah at the behest of the GSS/ISA) and the
training or other use of coercion and torture by the interrogator/witnesses were similarly blocked
via objections [on the basis of the information having been classified by the government of
Israel] by the U.S Attorneys and the GOI.").
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about Salah's treatment by the birds so as to adequately gauge what sort of treatment
he received at their hands.
This logic is borne out by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the use of
confidential informants in the Sixth Amendment context. In the United States, once an
individual has been arrested and formally charged before a judicial officer, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches. 29 1 At that instant, the use of paid informants or
undercover officers engaged in an effort to "deliberately elicit" incriminating
statements from a criminal defendant violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.292
To make out a violation, "the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their
informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to
elicit incriminating remarks. '293 This right has been explicitly recognized in the case of
jailhouse informants seeking information from criminal defendants.294
While it is obvious that Salah, who was interrogated by the ISA eleven years prior
to being indicted in the United States, did not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
while detained, the above jurisprudence reflects the Supreme Court's serious concern
with the interrogation of a defendant outside the presence of counsel. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has remarked that the more serious violation occurs when the defendant
is not even aware that the defendant is being interrogated.295 These conditions were
present in Marzook. Whatever threats or violence the birds may or may not have
carried out, their actions undisputedly rose to the level of deliberate elicitation, at least
in the form of questioning. The opinion is clear that Salah was not aware that he was
being interrogated by spies for the ISA, who directly asked that he provide information
on his Hamas-related activities. He had been before a military court judge several
times, and even had been appointed counsel, so the interrogation occurred in the form
of an end run around his lawyer after he had been before a judicial officer. Considering
all these facts in their entirety, simply denying the motion to suppress the written
statement made to the birds without requiring further testimony and discovery by the
government seems to be a violation of at least the spirit of relevant Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.296
On a final point, as with the Abu Ali district court opinion, the Marzook court
conducted a brief shocks-the-conscience analysis that in many ways was superfluous to
the voluntariness inquiry, and it relied entirely on case citations that provided authority
for the test in the Fourth Amendment sphere only. 29 7 The analysis on this issue was a

291. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2008) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment right applies after a formal hearing in which charges are made against an
individual even in the absence of a public prosecutor).
292. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,206 (1964).
293. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986).
294. See id.; see also United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
295. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 457 (citing Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206).
296. The Supreme Court has noted that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a
"safeguard[] ...deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty," and,
in conjunction with other constitutional amendments, serves as an "essential barrier[] against
arbitrary or unjust deprivation of human rights." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
297. United States v. Marzook (Marzook IV), 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 744, 774 (N.D. I11.
2006). The fact that there was no joint venture between the U.S. and Israeli authorities was less
controversial. See id. at 773-74.
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mere paragraph long, and cited to the Abu Ali district court opinion decrying the use of
evidence derived from torture in the United States courts.298 Aside from the
jurisprudentially suspect nature of the analysis and authorities cited, the analysis adds
nothing to the voluntariness inquiry, thereby underscoring the questionable nature of
conducting a shocks-the-conscience inquiry in the Fifth Amendment context.
Both the Abu Ali and Marzook decisions illustrate the difficulty of the voluntariness
inquiry in the context of a terrorism trial. The applicability of the voluntariness test
poses similar dilemmas whether the criminal harm being prosecuted is immediate, as in
the case of Abu Ali, or concerns expansive conspiracy charges that do not allege any
role in planning or perpetrating violence, as in the case of Salah. 299 Ultimately, when
faced with a foreign confession in a terrorism case, courts need to be able to confront
the issue of whether the confession itself is the product of coercion without being
overly influenced by the background and nature of the defendants and the charges
against them.
III. METHODS FOR ENSURING COERCED STATEMENTS ARE KEPT INADMISSIBLE
What constitutes a voluntary statement made abroad can easily become a contested
matter, as the above sections hopefully demonstrate. Even though highly fact specific,
the unpredictable nature of the voluntariness inquiry can lead to curious results. These
concerns raise the question of whether there is a viable alternative to the voluntariness
test. After all, when the tactics employed were clearly coercive, statements given to
foreign law enforcement should be found to be involuntary.
A. The Karake Decision

In United States v. Karake,3°° Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia found three confessions to have been
involuntary. 30 ' The confessions were made by three defendants, among whom were
members of the Liberation Army ofRwanda, to Rwandan authorities investigating the
killings of two American tourists in Uganda.30 2
The court credited the testimony of the three defendants because they all described
similar treatment in great detail, and, most importantly, because the medical evidence
showed strong indications of physical abuse. 30 3 The decision also highlighted the
evidentiary differences between the instant case and that ofAbu Ali.3 04 As withAbuAli

298. Id.at 774.
299. For a highly critical analysis of the prosecution of Muhammad Salah, see Michael E.
Deutsch & Erica Thompson, Secrets andLies: The Persecutionof MuhammadSalah (PartI),
37 J. PALESTINE STUD. 38 (2008); Michael E. Deutsch & Erica Thompson, Secrets andLies: The
Persecutionof Muhammad Salah (PartII), 38 J.PALESTINE STUD. 25 (2008).
300. 443 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2006).

301. Id.
302. Id.at 12, 94.
303. Id.at 61-63.

304. Id.at 85 n. 110 ("It is worth noting the significant differences between the evidence
presented in this case and that in United States v. Abu Ali.... In Abu Ali, defendant alleged that
he was whipped on his back, hung by his wrists from the ceiling of his cell, chained in a
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and Marzook, it is a difficult exercise to second-guess a court conducting an inquiry
into the voluntariness of statements made abroad, and this Article does not make these
criticisms lightly. However, some key distinctions are worth pointing out. First, the
Karake court considered State Department reports on human rights abuses in the
Rwandan detention center in question, while, as noted above, the courts in both Abu Ali
and Marzook did not consider similar reports. 30 5 Karake also allowed individuals other
than defendants to testify as to the abusive treatment they had received at the hands of
Rwandan authorities at the detention facility, while the Abu Ali court did not allow two
British nationals to testify about their torture at the hands of Saudi authorities.3 °6
Aside from these evidentiary distinctions, there is the nature of the crime. While the
killing of two American tourists is a serious violent crime that deserves condemnation
and punishment, it does not fall under the rubric of large-scale terrorism, especially
that of the Islamic variety. Of the forty-five groups currently on the State Department's
30 7
list of banned FTOs, thirty-one are Islamic and/or Arab in orientation or makeup.
The Liberation Army of Rwanda, elements of which were responsible for a genocide in
1994, is not so listed. Courts are surely not immune to the pressure to be perceived as
strong and resolute on the issue of terrorism, although whether such considerations
influenced the decisions in Abu Ali and Marzook is a matter for personal
interpretation.30° Also noteworthy is the type of entity conducting the interrogation.
crouching position, and beaten while in the custody of Saudi Arabian officials. The physical
evidence, however, did not support Abu Ali's claims. Though Abu Ali's medical expert
described certain linear marks on Abu Ali's back as 'highly consistent' with whipping, a doctor
who examined Abu Ali before he was transferred to the United States did not even record those
marks because they were 'inconsequential.' Moreover, the government's expert explained that a
scar from whipping would take approximately four weeks to heal, during which time they
'would be uncomfortable to touch.' This was significant because FBI officials observed Abu Ali
no more than 4 days after he alleged he was whipped, and witnessed no discomfort during Abu
Ali's interrogation. The government's expert refused to even term the marks on defendant's
back a 'scar' because they exhibited 'no depression, spreading or thickening.' Nor was the
pattern of marks consistent with scars from whipping. Also, one of defendant's medical experts
became 'defensive' and 'frustrated' during cross-examination, undermining her testimony. This
is all in marked contrast to the instant case, in which every medical expert found defendants'
allegations consistent with the scarring exhibited on their bodies. Additionally, FBI agents did
observe an injury to Karake that was consistent with his testimony that he was struck with a
brick. These serious and substantial differences mandate a different outcome here than was
reached in Abu AU." (citations omitted)).

305. Id.at 61.
306. Id; AMNESTY

INT'L, supranote 192, at 4-5. The Marzook court heard testimony from
Palestinians who claimed they had been mistreated by Israeli authorities but heavily discounted
their relevance. United States v. Marzook (MarzooklV), 435 F. Supp. 2d 708,760-61 (N.D. Ill.
2006).

307. See Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (July 7, 2009), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

308. The pressure to obtain results in terrorism cases can be analogized somewhat to that of
capital murder cases and can therefore impact the importance of securing a defendant's
confession. See Joseph L. Hoffman, House v. Bell and the Death of Innocence, in DEATH
PENALTY STORIEs 470 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009) ("In the absence of
[corroborative] testimony, the only alternative may be to try to obtain a confession from the
defendant, but this can lead to pressure that crosses the line into coercion." (citing Brandon L.
Garrett, JudgingInnocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 88-91 (2008) (giving examples of dubious
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Saudi Arabia and Israel each have a well-funded and modem internal-security
apparatus, and the United States in particular assuredly values the work Saudi and
Israeli security services perform in their routine course of business. These agencies
retain an ability to devise highly sophisticated tactics of interrogation, as well as to
furnish a professional and well-trained force of officers who can be called on to
provide testimony, if need be. None of this is true in the case of Rwanda, a troubled
and poor country only fourteen years removed from a genocide perpetrated by one
ethnic group against another.
B. Alternative Tactics and the Ticking Bomb
Whatever the arguable distinctions regarding terrorism-based crimes, it is perhaps a
risky endeavor to criticize the voluntariness test in this context, especially when one
considers the alternatives, two of which have prompted much commentary and
criticism in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. The existence of a system of
military commissions for so-called enemy combatants, who do not enjoy the same
number or quality of rights as a criminal defendant in the United States, is one such
alternative. Drawing on recent experience then, when one considers the fact that the
evidentiary rules of these commissions as constituted appear to provide for the
admission of statements or confessions without regard to how they were obtained, the
voluntariness test can seem practically harmless in comparison. 309 Another possible
alternative is to subject individuals to the practice of "extraordinary rendition," in
which individuals are sent to countries where the use of coercive techniques may be
employed more readily than in or by the United States. 310 Trial in a civilian court,
therefore, where the voluntariness test would govem the admissibility of a foreign
confession, seems to be a superior option to those discussed above.
Even before the current incarnation of the "war on terror," in Bin Laden the
government itself had pointed out that it would be "'positively perverse' to require
suppression of statements made to U.S. authorities abroad in the absence of Miranda
warnings, when those statements would be admissible if made to foreign police.3 '
Whatever the implications of the government pointing out the situation as it was in the
federal courts of the United States, it does seem logical to at least ask why U.S. agents
are ostensibly more restrained by American courts than are foreign police in obtaining
statements through coercion. One potential casualty of the perception that courts may
bind law enforcement's hand too tightly is that the government in turn may try to
institute policies that disfavor the use of federal criminal prosecutions as a viable
counterterrorism tactic. That the Supreme Court has already had occasion to issue
several decisions on extraordinary measures adopted by the government to detain,
interrogate, and prosecute terrorist suspects outside the traditional criminal context is
confessions in capital cases))).
309. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror," 108 COLUM. L.
REv. 1013, 1054 (2008) (noting that the legislation authorizing such extraordinary tribunals
"potentially allow[] the admission of evidence obtained through coercive interrogation").
310. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008); David Weissbrodt & Amy
Bergquist, ExtraordinaryRendition: A Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 123
(2006).
311. United States v. Bin Laden (Bin Laden 1), 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 187 n.13 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
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proof enough of the draw of nontraditional methods to bypass those constitutional
protections accruing to criminal defendants. However, given the recent and extremely
312
expansive use of conspiracy liability as a basis for a criminal terrorism prosecutions,
coupled with the decisions in Abu Ali and Marzook discussed above, the question can
be asked if the experience of the last seven years bears out the notion that the
government is constrained in prosecuting terrorists in federal court. Indeed, even the
pre-September 11 experience in terrorism trials, most notably Bin Laden, dealt with the
issue of confessions in a manner that would, in
the words of Professor Kim Lane
313
Scheppele, "give human rights lawyers pause."
Motivating the debate over the use of coercive interrogation techniques is the
hypothetical of the "ticking bomb," which poses the particular dilemma of how public
officials should deal with the prospect of saving a number of lives by torturing one
individual believed to have the information necessary to stop a deadly attack. The
concerns involving the ticking-bomb hypothetical also apply to the criminal
prosecution context. 314 In light of this concern, at least one scholar has argued for an
extension of the so-called public-safety exception 315 to the Mirandawarnings when
U.S. law-enforcement agents engage in interrogations of terrorism suspects abroad, so
as to allow for their subsequent criminal prosecution without the need for an
extraordinary tribunal.3 16 Even leaving aside most of the many valid criticisms of the
ticking bomb hypothetical,317 the near impossibility of showing the sort of
dangerousness that would allow for the admissibility of admittedly involuntary
statements comes into view. While there very well may be a valid public safety
exception to Miranda and, by extension, the voluntariness test, in times of true

312. See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal
and MilitaryModels, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1079, 1104-06 (2008); Peter Margulies, Guantanamo by
Other Means: ConspiracyProsecutionsandLaw Enforcement DilemmasAfter September 11,
43 GONZ. L. REv. 513 (2008).

313. Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1025 n.84 (2004).

314. See, e.g., David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV.
1425, 1440 (2005) (noting that the ticking-bomb hypothetical "has become the alpha and omega
of our thinking about torture"); see also ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007); Thomas P. Crocker, Torture,with Apologies, 86 TEX. L. REV.
569, 570 nn.4-5 (2008) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE

(2006)). For a discussion of the
constitutional implications of a similar type of hypothetical in the domestic criminal context preCONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

September 1 , 2001, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harryand the Real Constitution,64 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1457 (1997) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)).
315. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,653 (1984) (where police asked an arrestee about
the location of his discarded gun in a public supermarket without first Mirandizing him, the

Supreme Court noted "that this case presents a situation where concern for public safety must be
paramount to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in
Miranda").
316. See M.K.B. Darmer, Lessons from the Lindh Case: Public Safety and the Fifth
Amendment, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 241, 271-87 (2002) (discussing the extension of Quarles in the

international terrorism context).
317. See Luban, supra note 314.
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emergency, the cases discussed in this Article do not present that type of imminent
threat. It is undisputed that Abu Ali did not take any action to carry out any of the
conspiracies he was convicted of committing, and there was no evidence to suggest that
anyone in the United States had conspired with him in that regard. 318 Similarly, Salah
was tried in 2006 partially on the basis of statements he had made in 1993, so an
imminent threat of terrorist violence was not present, and the jury may not even have
believed the statements he made to the Israeli agents. 3 9 Based on the record examined
above, the applicability of the ticking-bomb hypothetical and debate in the context of
terrorism prosecutions is therefore questionable.
C. Adding Safeguards to Strengthen the Voluntariness Test
The discussion above hopefully illustrates the flaws in allowing the voluntariness
test, in its current guise, to remain as the relevant inquiry in terrorism cases involving
confessions made abroad. Several safeguards are required to prevent the introduction
of statements obtained by way of illegal coercive tactics, and thereby diminish the taint
of any conviction gained as a result of such evidence.
First, courts reviewing the voluntariness of a confession must squarely confront and
consider the State Department's country reports on human rights, so as to allow the
fullest possible picture of an interrogation by a given country's agents to be reflected in
the record. Put differently, the government should not be permitted to argue that no
torture or coercive interrogation took place in a given case, without confronting its
documentation of such practices in general in a given country. In situations where the
suspect does not have a right to counsel in a meaningful form, can be held for a long
period of time without charges being filed, and faces trial (if at all) in a military court,
courts must weigh the implications of these conditions of interrogation in light of the
State Department's reports, and not ignore them. Further, it is not clear why a foreign
intelligence service in a terrorism case should be presumed, like U.S. police are usually
presumed, to be acting in good faith.320 Both the Abu Ali and Marzook decisions
seemed to assume the good faith of the Saudi and Israeli authorities, respectively,
where the record, if considered in its entirety, would lead to the opposite result.
Second, courts should require that the government prove the voluntariness of any
confession under a clear and convincing standard, and not the lesser preponderance of
the evidence test. Supreme Court precedent mandates the lower standard on a motion
to suppress, based on the Court's observation that "from our experience over this
period of time no substantial evidence has accumulated that federal rights have
suffered from determining admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. ' ' 321 By

318. See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 262-65 (4th Cir. 2008) (criticizing the
district court's comparison of the Abu Ali case to the John Walker Lindh and Timothy McVeigh
cases but not addressing the district court's findings of fact regarding Abu Ali's actions to carry
out the conspiracies), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
319. See Margulies, supra note 312, at 535 n.135, 545.
320. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the Rule ofLaw, 60 VAND. L. REv. 1497, 1536 (2007)
(noting that, for example, inthe context of a constitutionally permissible pretextual traffic stop,
"the presumption of good faith accorded police officers would almost always lead a court to
credit any race-neutral explanation given for the stop").
321. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,488 (1972).
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way of example, in the context of inevitable discovery, which the Court held "involves
no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready
verification or impeachment," it declined to require a clear and convincing evidence
standard.322 A foreign interrogation, with its alien rules, dynamics, and language, seems
to present a situation in which courts are asked to speculate, precisely because the
record is replete with contested recollections and assertions, quite the opposite 323
of
"demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment."
Indeed, because modem torture techniques are designed not to leave physical marks,324
detecting the effects of torture may prove near impossible, since, as was true in Abu
Ali, the evidence of psychological damage was highly contested and therefore could
not rise to the level of a demonstrated fact capable of ready verification.
In the foreign interrogation context, it is undisputed that the exclusionary rule will
have little to no deterrent effect on the conduct of foreign intelligence agencies. Given
the potential that this situation creates for an end run around Miranda, foreign
statements need to be subjected to a higher level of judicial scrutiny. Closing this
loophole would serve the purpose of ensuring that the government does not employ
foreign governments to conduct more permissive interrogations than allowed by the
Constitution. As Justice Brennan noted in dissent in Nix v. Williams, "[i]ncreasing the
burden of proof serves to impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision
325
and thereby reduces the risk that illegally obtained evidence will be admitted.9
Finally, it is not clear what the purpose is of focusing on a defendant's
characteristics or actions under interrogation, since they do not really add anything to
the voluntariness analysis. 326 As noted above, a more informed defendant might be
much quicker to confess in a political/terrorism case than one less aware of the
potential brutality of the interrogators. Additionally, scrutinizing individuals' behavior
while interrogated in conditions where no lawyer or charges are forthcoming with any
degree of predictability, if ever, seems to be imposing an unreasonable burden on a
defendant to demonstrate an involuntary confession. If one of the main contentions of a

322. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984) (ruling, in the context of a case
involving the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, that a preponderance of the
evidence standard suffices on motions to suppress generally) (citations omitted).
323. Id.
324. Condon, supra note 230, at 700 (quoting United Nations guidelines to the effect that
"the absence of physical evidence of trauma 'should not be construed to suggest that torture did
not occur, since such acts of violence against persons frequently leave no marks or scars');
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST & PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LEAVE No MARKS: ENHANCED
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(2007), available at http://

physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/2007-phr-hrf-summary.pdf (describing
enhanced interrogation methods, many of which cause mental and psychological harms).
325. Nix, 467 U.S. at 459-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
326. Professor Mark Godsey's suggestion would be to replace the nebulous voluntariness
test with a uniform one that measures whether or not law-enforcement agents engage inbehavior
that "objectively penalizes" a criminal defendant for exercising his right to silence. See Godsey,
supra note 20, at 518-39. Such a test would serve the more pertinent purpose of focusing only
on the conduct of the interrogators, although its application seems limited to the domestic
context. Indeed, Godsey hesitates at a blanket application of such a test in the terrorism context,
when statements are made to foreign police abroad, so an exclusive focus on the foreign
officials' conduct may be an unrealistic basis on which to exercise discretion. Id. at 527 n.3 10.
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defendant moving to suppress is that he/she has been traumatized severely by the
interrogation, then the focus must be entirely on the tactics of the interrogation, not the
behavior of the defendant, whose voluntariness is seriously limited by the
circumstances of his detention.
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the application of the voluntariness test has been haphazard, much like
in its heyday prior to Miranda.Where the terrorism context provides a new life for its
use, it is hard not to conclude that it has been applied in an arbitrary fashion. Given the
inapplicability of Mirandato foreign interrogations, perhaps a voluntariness inquiry is
all that is possible under current circumstances, legal and political. Nevertheless,
minimum safeguards need to be added to the test so as to avoid the appearance of a
sham. When confessions are admitted even though there was little to no opportunity to
consult with a lawyer, and the security agencies conducting the interrogations have
been cited in official U.S. government reports for engaging in widespread abusive
interrogation, the question of how voluntariness requirements have truly been met is
not easily answered. Without the imposition of some objective criteria, raising the
standard of proof, or presuming some level of prejudice, courts engaging in such
analyses are likely to make rulings at odds with all the relevant facts in the record.

